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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay provides an analysis
of the interaction between special interest groups, public interest factors, median
voters' tastes and preferences regarding the provision of medical services for the
poor, and cost containment policies on one side, and drug reimbursement levels, the
size of state Medicaid programs, and the size of states’ drug budgets on the other.
The relative strengths of special interest are shown to be one of the most important
determinants of drug reimbursement levels and drug expenditures. The median
voters’ preferences significantly explain the size o f states’ Medicaid programs. The
results verify the existence of substantial variation in state Medicaid programs, and
point to potentially growing disparities as a result of current policies.
The second essay examines alternatives to the traditional retrospective fee for
service (FFS) payment mechanisms regarding Medicaid inpatient hospital services.
These alternatives may be grouped into direct price or utilization controls,
particularly, prospective payment and coverage limitations, and managed care, either
in the form of fee for service primary care case management, or risk based enrollment
in prepaid health plans or health maintenance organizations. Both special interest
groups and median voter variables are shown to have significant explanatory power in
the adoption of these alternative payment mechanisms.
The third essay uses a system of six equations to examine the relative effects
of direct and market driven cost containment policies, relating to the general inpatient
hospital component of Medicaid. Direct cost containment policies, consisting of
diagnosis related groups prospective payment systems and rate-of-increase control

ix
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based prospective payment systems are found to be effective. To a lesser extend.
Managed care principles also generate savings. Furthermore, significant substitute
and complementary relationships between program components emphasize the
importance of system-wide analysis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Health care is one of the fastest growing industries in our economy. Both private
and public health care expenditures have grown substantially since World War n, and
particularly since the latter half o f the 1960s when the Medicare and Medicaid programs
were established. This dissertation consists of three essays concerning Medicaid
expenditures. The issue that binds these three essays is reimbursement to providers
participating in the Medicaid program.
States have traditionally had substantial autonomy regarding the administration of
their Medicaid programs. This freedom encompasses eligibility criteria, the types and
scopes of services offered, and rates and methods of reimbursement. This flexibility
enjoyed by states has resulted in substantial variety between programs with important
implications regarding the treatment of the poor. To the extent that state level factors
result in differences in services covered, discrepancies may be expected in the medical
treatment of the nation’s poor across states.
The first essay focuses on the pharmaceutical drug component of Medicaid. The
principal thesis of this essay is that the variation in reimbursement rates of the two main
components of the prescription drug price is primarily the result of the relative strengths
of interest groups. A secondary hypothesis discussed in this essay is that interest groups
have an indirect impact on pharmaceutical drug expenditure levels as well. The second
essay provides an analysis of the reasons why states have adopted certain cost
containment policies relating to the inpatient hospital component of Medicaid. These
cost containment policies often take the form of alternatives to the traditional fee for

l
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service reimbursement methodologies, such as prospective payment mechanisms or
managed care principles. The relative strengths of interest groups and the preferences of
the median voter are hypothesized to determine the probability of a state adopting these
alternative reimbursement systems. The third essay is an extension o f the second,
analyzing the relative effectiveness of the cost containment mechanisms employed by
states. These costs containment systems include direct control over prices and utilization,
market driven managed care, and indirect control through the manipulation of eligibility
standards.
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CHAPTER n
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIATION IN REIMBURSEMENT RATES OF
PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS UNDER MEDICAID
I have no great faith in political arithmetic.
Adam Smith (1776)
SECTION II.I: INTRODUCTION
One of the most frequently debated issues in the government is the upward
spiraling cost of healthcare entitlement programs. All parties involved commonly agree
that reducing the growth rates, if not the absolute sizes, of the programs is essential.
Some have argued for relinquishing control over these programs to the individual states.
To better evaluate this debate and the consequences of suggested solutions to the cost
problem, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of the driving forces behind
expenditure patterns. States have traditionally been given extensive autonomy regarding
the logistics of one of these entitlement programs, particularly Medicaid. This makes it
an ideal vehicle for analyzing the impact of transferring control over entitlement
programs from the federal to the state level.
One component of Medicaid expenditures, which has received increased attention
in recent years, involves the reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs. Although
reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs is not required under Medicaid law, all state
Medicaid programs provide some prescription drug benefits. Real national
pharmaceutical drug expenditures as a component of Medicaid more than doubled from
1985 to 1994, increasing from $2,031 million to $4,177million, claiming approximately
seven percent of total expenditures of the program.1

3
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Acquisition cost

Dispensing fee

(cost of goods sold)

(gross margin)

Break-even cost*
Dispensing cost

N et profit

pharmacists' salaries
rent______________
•insurance
prescription supplies
pharmacy licenses
advertising________
utilities__________
depreciation_______
e tc ...

Figure 2.1 : Break down of the selling price of a pharmaceutical drug.
Source : Francis A. Marino, Principles of Pharmaceutical Accounting. Henry Kimpton
Publishers, London, 1980.
The main focus of this paper is the reimbursement of prescription drugs covered
under the Medicaid program. The starting point for the analysis is the selling price o f
prescription drugs, which can be broken down into an ingredients cost component, also
referred to as the pharmacist's acquisition cost, and a dispensing fee component. The
dispensing fee, in turn, is divided into dispensing cost and a net profit; acquisition and
dispensing costs constitute the break-even cost for the pharmacist (see Figure 2.1).
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Ingredient costs and dispensing fees are reimbursed by state Medicaid programs through
separate procedures. These components will be discussed in more detail in section I.n .
Although little variation is observed across states, particularly in the average
ingredient costs per prescription, substantial differences exists in the level of
reimbursement of Medicaid prescription drugs. A cursory examination o f descriptive
statistics, albeit not conclusive, provides some evidence. The mean estimated ingredient
cost per drug for 1991 was calculated at $18.16 with a standard deviation of 1.77 (the
standard deviation drops to 1.19 when one outlying observation was removed)2. In
contrast, the mean percentage markup (see Section n.B) for that year was 7.35% with a
standard deviation of 3.44. A similar, but less conspicuous pattern was found when
comparing the estimated dispensing costs and fees for that year. One goal of this paper is
to explain this variation, a good understanding of which is crucial for the construction of
effective and efficient cost-control legislation.
Federal, and more importantly, state Medicaid policies play an important role in
the level of prescription drug expenditures. During the past two decades state
governments have attempted to reduce the growth rate of Medicaid drug expenditures
through several different cost containment programs, such as Drug Formularies,
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) Drug Reimbursement Regulations, and Drug
Utilization Review programs. Cone and Dranove (1986) and Moore and Newman (1993)
have shown that the economic theory of regulation, developed by Gary S. Becker and
George J. Stigler, plays a important role in the enactment of these policies across states.
One hypothesis of this research is that special interest groups play a significant role in
determining the level o f reimbursement of the dispensing and ingredient costs of drugs
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covered by the Medicaid program. The level of reimbursement for pharmaceutical drugs
under Medicaid is particularly important to special interest groups considering that other
third party payers may base their payment policies on those of their own states. In
addition to special interest variables, the model includes variables representing the
public's interest and variables accounting for structural differences between states'
pharmaceutical industries and economies.
Pertaining to prescription chug reimbursement levels three endogenous variables
will be investigated: (1) dispensing fees, (2) the percentage markup on ingredient costs,
and (3) the sum of these two components. The state dispensing fee and the percentage
markup both represent sources o f profit to pharmacists. The sum of these components
provides an estimate o f total profits received by pharmacists for prescription chugs
covered under Medicaid. Notice that this estimate exaggerates profits since it includes
dispensing costs. However, dispensing costs constitute a reasonably fixed percentage of
the fee and should, therefore, not affect the observed variation which this paper attempts
to explain. The second section o f this paper consists of a discussion of the dependent and
explanatory variables included in these equations.
Next, the dispensing fees and percentage markup will be considered in the
framework of a larger model designed to explain the variation in states’ Medicaid
prescription drug expenditures. An additional endogenous variable included in the
model is the number o f Medicaid recipients in the state. The state Medicaid prescription
drug expenditure model and the state Medicaid recipients model will be discussed in
section three. Section four contains a description of the data and the methods used for
estimation. Section five discusses the results.
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SECTION H.H: THE DISPENSING FEE AND PERCENTAGE MARKUP
The Dispensing Fee
The dispensing fee covers pharmacists for expenses incurred only through
operations in their drug prescription department, accounting for such activities as
labeling, filling, and drug counseling; additionally, the dispensing fee includes a net
profit.
Dispensing fee = (Cost of dispensing) + k

(2.1)

Medicaid reimbursement of dispensing fees can be based on either a fixed fee or variable
fee structure. The fixed fee method, used by the majority of states, provides an identical
dispensing fee to all participating pharmacists (Table 2.1). Disadvantages of this method
include overpayment to pharmacists who have a low per-unit dispensing cost, or
underpayment to pharmacists who have relatively high costs regardless of quality and
efficiency of services rendered. Furthermore, ignoring efficiency may have adverse
effects on cost containment incentives. Finally, this method fails to adjust for differences
which are due to, for example geographic locations (rural versus metropolitan.3), or type
of ownership (chain versus family pharmacists).
Alternatively, some states have adopted a variable fee approach attempting to
account for the deficiencies of the fixed fee method (Table 2.1). While this process
appears more efficient, it is associated with substantial costs of monitoring and
verification of accuracy of the data. Within this approach, one can distinguish between
the individual variable fee reimbursement which is based on the costs of operation of
individual pharmacists (adjusting for such concepts as overhead cost, location, and
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s
volume), and the categorically variable fees which distinguishes pharmacists according to
their location, type o f ownership, and type of pharmacy.
Table 2.1 : Dispensing fees for 1994 by state and method.

AlatMiTia^ ~ ^ > ::'"'
$5.40
Arizona,:. .. ... • 7"' ... 2.50
Arkansas
.J
.
l 4.51 + .103EAC
4.05
California
4.08
Colorado
4.10
Connecticut
3.65
Delaware
4.50
DC.
4.23
Florida
4.41
Georgia
4.67
Hawaii
Illinois
3.58
4.00
Indiana
5.77
Louisiana
3.00
Massachusetts
3.72
Michigan.
Minnesota
3.85
4.91
M ississippi
4.09
Missouri
4.64
Nevada
4.00
New M exico
5.60
North Carolina
4.50
North Dakota
3.50
Ohio
5.10
Oklahoma
*
3.50
Pennsylvania

IR hdd^hahd,.
iSbutfrCSrolina
fSou&Diakota
iTerinesseer.
•Texas "
:Vermont
.'Virginia
W estVugfnia:.. • .•• ....
iXPynirimK- ' T' "
•
•Alaska?' ''..'
Idaho *
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Montana
Nebraska:
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Oregon
Utah.
.
W ashington v > \
W isconsin

3.40
4.05
4.75
3.91
6.30
4.25
4.40
2.75
4.70

3.45-11.46
4.41 / 5.38
4.02 - 6.25
3.59 - 4.82
4.75 - 5.75
3.35 - 5.35
4.66 / 7.70
2.00 - 4.08
2.84 - 5.05
3.25-4.15
3.73 - 4.07
4.50 - 5.50
3.67 - 4.02
3.90 - 4.40
; • 3.65 - 4.50
4.69 - 6.67

Source : National Pharmaceutical Council. Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical
Assistance Programs, 1994 and 1995.
The Ingredient Reimbursement Basis And Percentage Markup
The ingredient reimbursement can be obtained using information regarding the
actual acquisition cost (AAC), the average wholesale price (AWP), or the wholesale
acquisition cost (WAC). Considering the high cost o f acquiring reliable data to calculate
the AAC, states have used the latter two methods to estimate acquisition costs as an
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alternative. However, neither the AWP nor the WAC represent an accurate or direct
measure of actual acquisition costs.
Ordinarily, the AWP is an average representing the suggested wholesale price to
the pharmacy, and does not account for discounts which the pharmacist may obtain (for
example through large quantity or direct purchases).

Considering these discounts, which

have been estimated to range from 10 to 18 percent4, averaging at 16, states customarily
deduct an estimated percentage, £>,. from the AWP to determine the level of
reimbursement. On average,
AAC = AWP -16%

( 2 .2 )

The remaining difference between the rate at which states reimburse pharmacists and the
AAC represents a second source of profits for the pharmacist and is called the percentage
markup in this paper. The percentage markup associated with this method, is calculated
as
%>MARKUP = 16%- a

(2.3)

For example, referring to Table 2.2, for Alaska, Dx = 5%, implying an estimated
percentage markup of 11%>.
On the other hand, for states which use the WAC measure the percentage markup
is calculated as follows. Wholesalers generally add an estimated 3.39 percent to the
wholesale acquisition cost to derive the price of prescription drugs which they charge to
pharmacists. Thus, to pharmacists
AAC = WAC + 3.39%.
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(2.4)

10
Table 2.2: States and methods used to obtain the Ingredient Reimbursement Basis in 1994
WAC+9.2%
AW P - 5%
EAC
^akansas V: ;- AW P - 10.5%
California
AW P - 5%
: Colorado
AW P - 1 0 / WAC + 18%
AW P - 8%
^Connecticut.
'Delaware
AAC (=AWP)
D.C.
AW P - 10%
Florida.
WAC + 7%
Georgia
AW P - 10%
Hawaii
AW P - 10.5%
Idaho
AW P
AW P - 10%
Illinois
AWP - 10%
Indiana
Iowa :
AW P -10%
AW P - 10%
.Kansas,
:
Kentucky
AW P - 10%
AW P - 10.5%
Louisiana
EAC/AWP - 5%
Maine
Maryland
WAC + 10%
WAC + 10%
Massachusetts
Michigan
AW P - 10% /A A C
Minnesota
AW P - 7.6%
M ississippi
AW P - 10%
AWP - 10.43%
Missouri

IFleevlHanipsfmK
iNeBpJersor
N ew M exicb

iNortEDakota^

v<ohio^'^rs, -

AWP - 10%
AWP-8.71% /W A C+12.52%
AWP - 10%
AWP -10%
AWP - 0/6%
AWP -10.5%
AWP
AWP - 10%
AWP -10%
AWP - 7%
AWP - 10.5%
AWP - 11%
AWP
AWP
AWP - 9.5%
AWP - 10.5%

.
'OBfficnha:' ' ' '• ‘
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South.Carolina
SouflfeDakota
^ T e n n e s s e e ::
Texaa
AWP - 1 0.49%/W AC+12%
Utah
AWP - 12%
Vermont
AWP - 10%
AWP - 9%
Virginia
AWP - 11%
W ashington
W ek»Virginia.
: . AWP
W £consm:;.v :• 7
AWP - 10%
AWP - 4%
W yom ing-./

Source : National Pharmaceutical Council. Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical
Assistance Programs, 1995.
Medicaid reimbursement of prescription drugs adds a percentage markup to the WAC, say
M x. Thus, pharmacists get an ingredient reimbursement (IR) equal to
IR = WAC + M x

(2.5)

Using (2.4) and (2.5), the percentage markup enjoyed by pharmacists under this method,
IR - AAC, is
%MARKUP = M x-3.39%.
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(2.6)
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Accordingly, for Florida (Table 2.2) M x = 7%, yielding a percentage markup o f 2.61%.
Table 2.2 contains a list of states and the methods they employed in 1994 to obtain the
ingredient reimbursement basis.
Explanatory Variables
Public and special interest variables
There are two opposing theories explaining the enactment of legislation regarding
the delivery of medical services, or, within the context of this paper, the reimbursement of
pharmaceutical drug expenditures through states' Medicaid policies. The “political” or
“public interest” theory assumes that legislation is passed by policy makers based solely
on benevolence and altruism directed toward greater equity in the delivery of Medicaid.
In contrast, according to the economic theory of regulation, industries or special interest
groups acquire or solicit regulation from the state which is designed and operated for their
benefit.5 The ability of an interest group to obtain benefits through legislation is affected
by the underlying structure of the interest group, the political process, and the interaction
of competing groups both with each other and the legislature. Groups which are more
easily organized and whose members are affected more directly and expect to acquire
greater gains or losses (ceteris paribus), as a result of legislation, are likely to allocate
more resources toward influencing the political process. The benefit or cost to a policy
maker of voting for a particular legislation is expressed in terms of political support or
loss, through votes, campaign contributions, or volunteer time, from groups whom are
affected by that legislation.
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Thus, there are two groups of policy related variables which are expected to affect
the level of reimbursement of prescription drugs through Medicaid policy. The first
group of explanatory variables is associated with the public interest theory o f legislation.
1. The state’s budget surplus. Cone and Dranove (1986) argue that a state's incentive
to implement cost containment policies is a product of the political cost of taxation,
expressed in terms of the state's relative budget deficit.6 Budget deficits are expected
to have a positive impact on a state’s willingness to enact cost containment policies.
Similarly, the cost of taxation is expected to have a negative effect on reimbursement
of Medicaid drugs; states with low or negative budget surpluses are expected to
provide lower reimbursement rates. The state's relative budget surplus is defined as,
„ .
state revenue - state expenditures
.
Relative Budget Surplus = --------------------------state revenue
2. The state’s per recipient Medicaid drug expenditure. The budgetary burden
attributable to the state's Medicaid drug expenditures is also expected to affect
reimbursement levels.7 A higher budgetary burden in the previous year is
hypothesized to generate political pressure to limit related expenditures. The first
variable considered in this context is the state's per recipient Medicaid drug
expenditures from the previous year, calculated as total state Medicaid drug
expenditures divided by the number of Medicaid drug recipients in the state, i.e.
_
_
..
state medicaid drug expenditures
Per Recipient Drug Expenditures = ---------------------- — ------------- .
state medicaid drug recipients
3. The share of the state’s Medicaid budget allocated to prescription drugs. The
next variable measuring the state’s budgetary burden related to Medicaid prescription
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drug reimbursement is the share of the state's Medicaid budget allocated to
prescription drug expenditures in the previous year, defined as
w j- j
o,
State Medicaid Drug Expenditues
Medicaid Drug Share = ------------------------ 2---- ------------ .
State Medicaid Expenditures
Pertaining to the economic theory of legislation, the interest groups which are
most likely to be affected by state legislation on Medicaid reimbursement of drag
expenditures are those related to recipients, pharmacists, physicians, and drug
manufacturers.
1. The number of Medicaid recipients relative to the state's population. The first of
the interest groups considered is the recipient group. The number of overall Medicaid
recipients relative to the state’s population is used to measure the influence of this
group,
~
,•
State Medicaid Recipients
Medicaid Recipients Relative to Population = ------------------------- --------.
State Population
Recipients are expected to favor higher reimbursement rates, which may encourage
higher numbers o f providers to participate in the program, implying better access to
covered services. Furthermore, higher reimbursement rates may translate into more
time and attention devoted to each recipient.8 However, the political influence of this
group is not expected to be significant. Low income and less educated groups have
historically had marginal participation in the voting process. Furthermore, many low
income families go through spells of eligibility which last only a few months to a
year. Thus, eligibility for Medicaid tends to be transitory, a characteristic which is not
very conducive to organization and political recognition of this group.9
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2. The American Pharm aceutical Association (APhA). Higher reimbursements
would, by definition, result in a higher net profit per drug for pharmacists. Therefore,
the pharmaceutical lobbying group, the American Pharmaceutical Association
(APhA), is expected to support higher reimbursement rates. Because of an absence of
data on political contributions made by the APhA, the percentage of pharmacists
belonging to the APhA, is used to capture the influence of this interest group.
3. Physician interests. What about physician interest groups? Unlike drug expenditure
containment policies which are aimed, for example, at reducing the range of available
drugs, such as formularies, drug reimbursement policies do not affect this group
directly. Nonetheless, they are expected to have a preference regarding different cost
containment measures; particularly, physicians favor policies which do not affect their
freedom to prescribe the most appropriate drug to an individual patient. Physicians
are therefore expected to have an incentive to support lower Medicaid drug
reimbursement rates over other drug expenditure containment policies. Due to the
lack of data on the lobbying activities and political contributions of this group, the
number of physicians belonging to the American Medical Association is utilized to
capture its influence.10
4. The drug m anufacturing industry. The drug manufacturing industry is affected
only indirectly by reimbursement levels. Containment of the Medicaid budget has
been on the foreground o f the political debate for more than a decade, particularly at
the state level. Knowing this, related interest groups will support cost cutting that
affects their counterparts, with the goal of protecting their own revenues.
Accordingly, this group is expected to support a lower level of reimbursement for
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both the dispensing and ingredient costs. The more states save by reducing dispensing
fees and the markup, the smaller will be the effort to enact legislation which will
adversely affect the drug manufacturing industry. On the other hand, cooperative
relationships may exist between this group and pharmacists, creating some ambiguity
regarding their motivations and influences.
To measure the drug manufacturing industry’s influence its relative concentration as
an employer is used. The data used here falls under the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) industry number 2834, which includes *establishments primarily
engaged in manufacturing, fabricating, or processing drugs in pharmaceutical
preparations for human or veterinary use. The greater part o f the products of these
establishments are finished in the form intended for final consumption..

The

higher the employment in the drug manufacturing industry the greater its lobbying
power. Relative employment in the drug manufacturing industry is calculated as
employment in drug manufacturing
state labor force
O ther explanatory variables
As discussed earlier, pharmacists ordinarily obtain drugs from manufacturers at
discounts ranging from 10 to 18 percent. It is reasonable to assume that bigger chain
pharmacists with their larger prescription volumes can earn the most discounts through
quantity purchases. Furthermore, such chains can achieve economies of scale as a result
of their own warehousing operations. These advantages which are inherent of this subset
of pharmaceutical companies suggests that the structure of the industry within states may
effect Medicaid drug reimbursement legislation. Particularly, states with pharmaceutical
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industries consisting of mainly chain pharmacists, each controlling large volumes of
prescription drugs, may compensate for the greater discounts with lower ingredient
acquisition cost estimates and dispensing fees. To capture the significance of the industry
structure, the percentage of chain pharmacists in a state is included in the regression. The
percentage of chain pharmacists is calculated as
n
. n1
number chain pharmacists
Percentage of Cham Pharmacists = ---------------------------------.
number of chain + number of community pharmacists
A negative sign is expected for this variable.
Furthermore, the state's per capita personal income is included in the model to
proxy the state's willingness and ability to pay for Medicaid services. Higher per capita
income (PCY) generally provides more resources for state programs and is expected to
have a positive effect. Table 2.3 contains a list o f variables used in this part of the
analysis.
SECTION II.III: STATE MEDICAID RECIPIENTS AND STATE MEDICAID
DRUG EXPENDITURES
State Medicaid Recipients
States have traditionally had extensive autonomy in shaping their Medicaid
programs.12 Eligibility requirements for Medicaid assistance, and therefore the number of
recipients of Medicaid services, is determined within each state, for example by
manipulating income standards, income disregards, resource standards, definitions of
disability, or any combination of these factors. The number of Medicaid recipients in the
state is therefore considered to be endogenously determined.13
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Table 2.3: Listing of explanatory variables.
The dispensing fee.
The percentage markup._____________ ______________________________
The total reimbursement.___________________________________________
Publiclhtegest variables
The state's budget surplus, representing the political cost of taxation_______
The state's per recipient Medicaid drug expenditures____________________
The share of the state’s Medicaid budget allocated to drug expenditures

Specfalimter&£va^

,,,

^

The number of Medicaid recipients relative to the state's population________
The number of pharmacists belonging to the American Pharmaceutical
Association______________________________________________________
The number of physicians belonging to the American Medical Association
The number of employees in the pharmaceutical drug manufacturing industry
relative to the state’s labor force._____________________________________
State and industry structure variables
The percentage of chain pharmacists in the state________________________
Per capita personal income
Median voter variables
Following Moore et al. and Wade et al., a median voter model is employed to
explain the variation in the number of Medicaid recipients per state. According to this
model taxpayers derive utility from the consumption o f goods and services as well as
from the transfer of income to welfare recipients. The median voter determines the
quantity of public goods by maximizing a utility function subject to a budget constraint:
maxU (X ,fV ,Z )s.t.Y = P X + P W
{A'JV}

(2.7)

where X is the quantity o f Medicaid services provided and Px is the tax price to the
median voter of an additional unit of service provided. W represents a composite bundle
of goods and services, with price Pw, consumed by the median voter, and Z is a set of
exogenous factors which influence the median voter’s preferences for W or X.
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The following variables are employed in the model to proxy the median voter’s
preferences for providing Medicaid services:
1. The tax price. The tax price is approximated by the state’s share of Medicaid
expenditures, derived by subtracting the Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage
(FMAP), thus
Tea Price = (I - FMAP)

(2.8)

According to this model the quantity of Medicaid services provided and the tax price are
inversely related.
2. Per capita income. Per capita income is used to measure the median voter’s
willingness or ability to provide Medicaid services. This variables is expected to have
a positive effect on the number of recipients.
3. Welfare share of the state budget. The share of the state’s budget already devoted
to welfare programs is included to proxy the median voter’s willingness to provide
services to the poor.
4. Demographic factors. In addition to the tax price and ability to provide, the existing
literature has hypothesized that voters are generally more willing to support children
and less willing to help minorities.14 To control for these factors the percentage of
individuals under the age of 21 covered by the AFDC program, and the percentage of
the population that is African American are included in the model.
Demand, interest group, and federal policy variables
The number of Medicaid recipients also depends on the current economic
environment, the activities of interest groups, and federal policies. To control for these
factors the following variables are included in the model.
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1. Demand variables include the percentage of the population under the poverty line,
the unemployment rate, and the relative benefits received by recipients. The relative
benefits received by individuals is approximated by the average payments to AFDC
families. A positive relationship is expected between these variables and the number
of Medicaid recipients.
2. Interest groups whose activities are hypothesized to affect the size o f the Medicaid
population are the hospital and physician groups. The influence of these groups will
be approximated by the number of hospital beds per capita and the percentage of
physicians belonging to the American Medical Association.
3. Federal policy variables include a dummy variable indicating years greater than
1986. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986 mandated the
expansion of Medicaid eligibility to include low-income infants, children, and
pregnant women.15 A second dummy variable is included for years greater than 1990
to take the effects of OBRA 1990 into account. New legislation due to OBRA 1990
include:
•

a mandate that all states adopt retrospective and prospective DUR programs
by 1993.

•

prohibition of drug formularies

•

requirement of drug manufacturer’s discounts or rebates.

•

prohibition of reductions in pharmacy payments for a 3 year period.

4. State dummies are included in this equation to account for the idiosyncrasies of the
states. At this first level of state control over the size of the program there are likely
to be substantial unobservable characteristics which may have an impact on
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legislation. After the eligible population has been established the program takes on
the form of an entitlement, at which point the logistics of the Medicaid program itself
will largely determine, for example, expenditure levels, while these state unique
characteristics assume diminished importance. These state dummies will therefore
not be included in the expenditure equations.
State Medicaid Drug Expenditures
Sections H and LH discussed the variation in reimbursement levels of prescription
drugs covered under the Medicaid program and the variation in the number of Medicaid
recipients across states. Dispensing fees, the percentage markup, and the number of
Medicaid recipients are all expected to affect expenditure directly.
In addition to the level of reimbursement and eligibility criteria, states have
substantial flexibility in determining which services will be covered, the extent to which
those services will be covered, and what methods of payment will be used.
Drug expenditure control policy variables
To reduce the growth of Medicaid drug expenditures states have adopted a variety
of measures, including:
1. Restricted formularies to limit the number of drugs which will be covered by the
Medicaid program. Following the analysis of Moore and Newman, the effect of
restricted formularies is accounted for through a dummy variable.16
2. Retrospective drug utilization review programs designed to enhance the quality of
care by eliminating unnecessary and inappropriate drug therapy.17
3. Drug-copayments which are meant to help finance the costs and reduce over
utilization of prescription drugs.18
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Non-drug control policy variables
When the coverage of a particular service becomes restricted due to legislative
action, a needy recipient will attempt to replace it with alternatives which are covered
under Medicaid. Medicaid recipients by definition have limited disposable income and
will, therefore, seek out the lowest cost care, i.e. the type of care that is most fully
covered by the program. For example, if coverage o f effective prescription drugs is
restricted a patient requiring care may substitute less effective drugs or even alternative
sources of medical care, such as physician, outpatient clinic, or even emergency room
services. This implies that a decrease in expenditures caused by restrictions in the
coverage of that service may have spill over effects into substitute services, causing
increases in related expenditures.19- :o
On the other hand, some services serve as complements to others. A patient
acquires prescription drugs through a two step process. The patient first initiates contact
with a physician who then prescribes the prescription drug if deemed necessary. In this
sense physician care and prescription drugs are complements, implying a positive
relationship between physician services and prescription drugs.21' ~
To control for these substitute and complementary relationships a number of non
drug control policy variables are included in the prescription drug expenditure equation.
Policies which are aimed at restricting the use of non-drug services may increase or
decrease prescription drug expenditures depending on whether they are substitutes or
complements. The following non-drug policy dummy variables, with a value of one if the
policy is in use, are included: the state

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

1. has limits on the coverage of inpatient hospital services.
2. uses Medicare principles, or prospective payment, for the reimbursement of inpatient
hospital services.
3. has limits on the coverage of outpatient hospital services.
4. uses Medicare principles, or prospective payment, for the reimbursement of outpatient
hospital services.
5. has limits on the coverage of skilled nursing facility services.
6. has limits on mentally retarded intermediate care facility services.
7. has limits on physicians’ inpatient hospital visits.
8. requires prior authorization for certain physician services.
9. uses Medicare principles to reimburse physician services.
In addition to these nine dummy variables the model also includes real co-payment
(deflated using the all-item CPI) on physician services.
Recipient and state characteristics
Not all age groups have the same demand for health services.
1. The percentage of recipients under age 21. Younger populations ordinarily enjoy
greater health status, therefore requiring fewer services.
2. The percentage of recipients age 65 and above. In contrast, older populations
generally have a higher demand for such services, including prescription drugs.
Furthermore, since long-term care and prescription drugs are not covered under
Medicare the percentage of the population over 65 years of age is expected to have a
significant impact on Medicaid prescription drug expenditures. Payments per user for
the aged were $668 compared to $69 and $148 for children and adults, respectively.23
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State characteristic variables included are the percentage o f the population living
in metropolitan areas, per capita pharmacists, and per capita physicians.
1. The percentage of people living in metropolitan areas is included to account for
any variation that is due to difference in their demand relative to their non
metropolitan counterparts.
2. Per capita pharmacists and physicians are included to capture the effects of greater
supply of, and access to, medical services.
Federal policy variables
The role of the federal government in the Medicaid program has been to establish
and regulate a minimum level o f benefits. Pertaining to this there have been two major
policy changes during the study period.
1. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987 which, among other legislation,
expanded Medicaid eligibility.
2. OBRA of 1990 which prohibited the use of drug formularies, required drug
manufacturers’ discounts or rebates, and prohibited reductions in pharmacy payments
for a three year period.24
3. Trend variables to account for year to year changes in Medicaid program logistics,
stemming, for example, from new legislation.
Table 2.4 : Growth rates of recipients of prescription drugs under Medicaid.

AL
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE

1.32
5.95
5.79
-1.4
-0.66
-3.07

-9.04
-0.43
4.86
11.59
-0.95
-5.24

7.64
3.98
3.34
6.18
-0.72
-3.22

4.41
7.28
-3.23
6.83
3.28
5.45

li08
4.20
2.69
5.80
0.24
-1.52

7.12
8.44
8.9
6.75
15.93
4.79

15.51
7.85
12.31
18.14
9.96
31.38

20.02
11.59
11.01
18.62
12.84
14.22

12.69
5.43
7.85
9.58
6.82
13.01

Source: Health Care Financing Administration, Form 2082. (Table Con’d.)
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3.53
0.23
5.5
2.02
6.48
10.79

11.77
6.71
9.11
11.02
10.41
14.84
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Table 2.4: Continued
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS*
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI*
SC
SD
TN*
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV

4.64
33.58
-2.26
7.39
-6.54
5.1
10.58
-11.8
4.16
7.7
2.36
-0.82
1.96
1.58
1.14
6.29
5.56
13.06
9.3
10.1
8.94
-1.04
-0.99
5.26
11.49
20.6
3.03
-10.39
3.75
1.98
-2.56
9.23
6.99
5.93
13.19
7.82
3.53
0.22
10.47
-8.71
8.12

M m

7.03
5.38
-1.75
4.22
7.19
-0.55
0.28
10.07
-1.23
5.64
6.13
-3.43
-0.25
-0.42
-4.93
2.44
7.75
9.7
2.98
9.76
5.87
-3.31
9.46
6.66
5.44
-1.4
1.1
34.98
3.46
-6.89
-0.07
1.58
14.85
15.11
11.51
9.53
0.54
2.29
10.34
2.13
6.37

11.32
2.42
0.62
-1.6
18.78
-1.61
2.15
23.03
1.67
-10.31
0.9
-1.67
-0.46
-0.03
-2.28
4.3
5.13
31.03
7.09
5.91
-0.18
-0.23
-15.24
8.76
6.58
-3.3
-2.92
2.66
7.64
-2.03
0.56
-2.35
4.44
9.49
7.57
7
2.04
3.87
4.33
0.38
2.09

10.64
8.22
5.15
-1.2
4.1
2.08
-1.13
5.68
5.2
20.73
3.39
2.61
3.37
2.36
-3.91
6.7
7.25
-14.55
15.69
5.71
3.74
9.33
0.74
5.9
14.23
0.15
3.34
6.83
14.37
6.1
4.81
5.21
8.3
13.35
10.72
8.36
7.2
5.43
7.23
-2.17
13.7

m m

tm
12.40
0.44
2.20
5.88
1.26
2.97
6.75
2.45
5.94
3.20
-0.83
1.16
0.87
-2.50
4.93
6.42
9.81
8.77
7.87
4.59
1.19
-1.51
6.65
9.44
4.01
1.14
8.52
7.31
-0.21
0.69
3.42
8.65
10.97
10.75
8.18
3.33
2.95
8.09
-2.09
7.57

mm m

23.23
12.92
-4.66
9.36
13.94
2.39
11.02
9.29
10.03
14.3
1.41
3.96
8.73
2.09
25.14
0.22
7.68
0.58
12.68
6.61
10.07
20.55
5.97
12.99
17.56
4.42
1.95
10.81
7.23
6.26
14.89
14.49
9.16
12.39
20.49
15.14
8.52
11.9
8.61
3.1
2.24

m

17.53
16.37
8.24
9.56
28.89
7.57
21.23
11.04
17.86
11.69
12.09
7.73
15.49
7.22
4.06
26.6
8.32
4.1
22.09
6.53
14.44
32.18
8.82
26.01
26.17
7.13
12
15.11
-0.1
12.18
16.31
22.57
17.03
15.19
21.71
17.78
17.62
16.84
14.25
5.58
18.64

30.08
18.97
9.36
5.64
24.23
11.72
23.03
10.69
12.59
10.39
7.8
10.19
5.93
1.25
1.3
14.23
11.17
-7.3
18.83
11.39
15.36
21.69
10.41
18.4
27.16
4.45
11.56
20.65
34.58
10.05
7.56
16.11
15.06
14.16
20.72
16.35
17.81
9.17
12.95
5.87
11.04

15.02
8.82
11.27
2.59
14.9
5.83
10.46
8.9
5.47
6.16
2.78
11.67
3.11
-10.28
5.48
13.01
3.26
50.96
13.4
7.48
8.2
14.73
8.43
13.34
8.52
4.86
3.3
10.54
7.96
0.12
18.83
8.8
6.97
15.23
14.17
8.73
12.53
6.57
10.37
7.01
10.08

w m m sm
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-4.35
9.22
10.15
7.95
12.06
-0.55
9.13
4.47
2.27
4.54
2.81
-4.14
5.79
16
-1.26
9.98
0.66
8.21
5.1
0.84
0.2
13.67
0.81
10.5
2.04
2.31
-0.65
-1.59
6.77
5.14
-55.6
4.1
6.53
-35.2
7.93
7.67
9.38
17.28
2.21
0.47
4.78

m m

16.30
13.26
6.87
7.02
18.80
5.39
14.97
8.88
9.64
9.42
5.38
5.88
7.81
3.26
6.94
12.81
6.22
11.31
14.42
6.57
9.65
20.56
6.89
16.25
16.29
4.63
5.63
11.10
11.29
6.75
0.40
13.21
10.95
4.35
17.00
13.13
13.17
12.35
9.68
4.41
9.36
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SECTION O.IV: DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS
Data was collected for 47 states (see Table 2.1) covering a period of 10 years from
1985 to 1994, adding up to a total of 470 observations. Social-economic data was
obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Medicaid prescription drug
policy specific data was compiled from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical
Assistance Programs publication by the National Pharmaceutical council. Additional
Medicaid specific statistics were acquired from publications of the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), including the internet site www.hcfa.gov.com. Other data
sources include the County Business Patterns, and data collected by Professor Moore.25.
The unit of analysis is the State. Missing observations for APhA membership and AMA
membership were extrapolated using averages from previous and following years.
Structural Breaks in the Data
Since its creation, the Medicaid program, and in particular cost containment, has
been subject to ongoing changes in the legislative process. Not surprisingly, F-tests for
structural breaks revealed that the parameter vector is not the same throughout the sample
period.26 Consequently, the data had to be divided into two five year segments.
Subsequent F-tests indicate that the data can be grouped into two five year blocks,
ranging from 1985-1989 and 1990-1994.
The break in the parameter vector coincides with extensive activity in the political
arena, regarding the Medicaid program. OBRA 1987 and 1989, for example mandated
eligibility expansions to include pregnant women and children up to age six with incomes
below 133 of the federal poverty level. The growth rates of prescription drug recipients
are shown in Table 2.4. With the exception of Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Tennessee,

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

26

all states experienced a substantial increase in the growth of prescription drug recipients.
Rhode Island and Tennessee also had higher growth rates from 1989 - 1993, but
experienced a substantial drop between 1993 and 1994.
As discussed earlier, OBRA 1990 also included several new legislative measures
relating to prescription drug coverage under Medicaid. Furthermore, there is a noticeable
increase in the number of states adopting ingredient markup adjustment policies between
1989 and 1990, perhaps in anticipation of OBRA 1990. Table 2.5 lists the years during
which the 47 states included in the sample adopted such adjustment measures, indicating
that the number of states using such measures increased dramatically from 20 (43
percent) to 39 (83 percent) in 1990.
Table 2.5 : Years in which states in the sample made adjustments in the ingredient
reimbursement basis.
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

Maine
Maryland

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y*

Y

Y

Y

Y*

Y

Y*
Y

Y

Massachusetts

.
Y

Michigan; "
Minnesota

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

87
90
90
90
89
90
87
89
89
88

85
87
90
90
89
85
90
89
88

85

Source : Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs, ♦States
which made adjustments on selected drugs only. (Table Con’d.)
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Table 2.5: Continued
Y

NewHampsfaire
New Jersey
.NewMexico
•’NeifcYdrfc
Northearolina .
North Dakota:..
. Ohio
Oklahoma .
‘Oregon:.
Pennsylvania
Jthodelslahd
SouthCarolina
SouthDakota:
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Total

,

.
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y*
Y*
Y

Y

Y

Y*

Y*
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

.

.

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

.
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y*
Y*
Y

Y*

Y*
Y

Y*

Y

Y

Y
Y
Y
Y*
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

9

14

18

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

#
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

90
91
88
88
85
90
80
89
94
90
91
85
90
90
94
85
86
88
87
87
90
91
85

9

.

8

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

20

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

39

42

42

40

41

Source : Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs.
Table 2.6: Independent variables employed.
Public policy
Interest group
3.

State characteristics

SC

47

Median voter

MV

57

Demand

D

67

Federal policy

FP

Y.

Recipient Characteristics

RC

87

Drug expenditure control

DC

W

Non drug control policy

NDC
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Estimation Procedures
There are five endogenous variables for each five year period, the dispensing fee,
the percentage markup, the estimated total profit, the number of Medicaid recipients, and
prescription drug expenditures. The independent variables may be grouped into nine
categories (Table 2.6).
The dispensing fee, percentage markup, Medicaid recipients, and drug
expenditure equations were estimated using a simultaneous equations iterative three stage
least squares (3SLS) approach. The model estimated for each five year period is as
follows:

y t =/3m+’t p P A , + i , l G f i „ + f ISC/3,l + sl
1=1

*

l=4

1=8

=fiK + t , P p -fi.'.+ i . IG-’A : + t , SC'Pr. + £ :
1=4

1=1

5

y>=f i «3*' EM V ^
i=l

1=8

8

10

+2 D ^
1=6

12

+' L I G ^
i= 9

+' Z ! G ^
i=ll

+s !

T4 = y\Y 14 + T:/24 + V3/34 + 'Z DC •#4 + Z RC •#4 + Z NDC ' #4 + £ 'FP ’/?,4 + ^5
i=l

i=4

i=6

117 1

(2.9)
Where y, is the dispensing fee, >\ is the percentage markup, y 3 is the number of Medicaid
recipients, and y, is the natural logarithm of pharmaceutical drug expenditures. The 3SLS
approach accounts for the information that may be embedded in the error covariances
e \e,£ j ] = cr,j I

for / * j , between the i* and

equations.27 Since the dependent variables

in the model are determined within the same system, it is reasonable to assume nonzero
“contemporaneous’'’ covariances between the equations’ disturbance terms. Furthermore,
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since the equations are over-identified, 3SLS will increase the efficiency of the
estimation.
To test whether this more technical estimation method produced more efficient
estimates, hypothesis tests were conducted of the form
H q : <xi; = 0

vs.

//, : at least one <jt/ * 0.
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests were executed both jointly and individually to test
whether the covariances between equations were significantly different from zero. The
LM statistic has a

^ distribution under the null-hypothesis, where (p) represents the

number of hypotheses being tested. The joint hypothesis test yielded a value of 31.466,
testing the hypothesis, H0 :crl2 = 0; crl3 = 0; crI4 = 0; or23 = 0; cr,4 = 0; a u =0 against the
alternative that at least one covariance is non-zero in the first period. The subscripts
represent, respectively, the prescription drug expenditure, dispensing fee, percentage
markup, and Medicaid recipients equations. The critical value of a chi-square distribution
with six degrees of freedom at the (a = 0.01) level is 16.81. The null-hypothesis is
therefore rejected in favor of the alternative. This result holds for the second period as
well. An individual hypothesis of particular interest examined the covariance of the
residuals of the dispensing fee and percentage markup equations, H0 :ov, = 0. The LM
test again led to the rejection of the null-hypothesis in favor o f the alternative in both
periods of the analysis. These results indicate substantial gains in efficiency of the 3SLS
method over OLS pertaining to the data used in this study.
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Furthermore, there exists adequate evidence in the existing literature that the level
of dispensing fees and the percentage markup are systematically related.28 States which
reimburse the dispensing fee at high rates tend to support lower percentage markups on
ingredient costs, perhaps to achieve a balance. The simple correlation coefficient
between these two variables is (-0.52686) and statistically significant at the (a = 0.01)
level. Given the above discussed reasons, the reimbursement levels for dispensing fees
and the percentage markup are assumed to be jointly determined. Simultaneous
equations estimation should therefore yield superior results over a single equations
approach.
In a separate model the sum of the dispensing fee (as a percentage) and the
percentage markup, calculated as
SUM = —DisPensing fee— + percentage markup
Average drug price

(2.10)

is considered. Two equations are estimated here using an iterative seemingly unrelated
regressions model:
S U M ^ =

/=!

.P P • /?„ + £

i=4

IG • 0 n + X S C ' Pn +

/=8

( 2 . 11 )

S U M ^ = f i 0 2 + f dP P - 0 l2 + ' £ l G / 3 l Z + £ S C - f i , 2 + s .

Before proceeding with the estimation the equations were also examined for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The diagnostics revealed that the former problem
is present in the data. The variances appear to be related to the size of the health care
market in the states. To account for this each equation in the system is first corrected
using the multiplicative heteroskedasticity model.29 Subsequent diagnostics, examining
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the 2SLS residuals, were used to verify that the problem had been removed. A
comparison of the 3SLS results from this analysis and OLS results indicate that the latter
method may either underestimate or overestimate the significance of certain factors.
SECTION H.V: EM PIRICAL RESULTS
The Dispensing Fee, Percentage Markup. And Total Profit Equations
The results for the 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 periods are shown in Tables 1.7 (ac) and 1.8 (a-c), respectively.
Public interest variables
The estimated coefficients associated with the public interest variables are
generally statistically insignificant and do not carry consistent signs. In this analysis, no
evidence was found to support the hypothesis that the states’ political cost o f taxation
determines the reimbursement levels of dispensing fees and ingredient component
markups of pharmacists’ production.
1. The state’s relative budget surplus has a positive and significant impact on total profit
during the 1985-1989 period, but is not significant in all other equations.
2. Per recipient Medicaid drug expenditures of the previous year is not statistically
significant in the total profit equation of the first period. Also, contrary to
expectations, the estimated coefficients for the component equations indicate a
positive relationship. For the second period the estimated coefficients are all negative
in the dispensing fee and total profit equations as predicted. This may be an
indication of mounting pressures to contain prescription drug expenditures over time.
3. The share of the state’s Medicaid budget allocated to prescription drugs in the
previous period also does not perform well. Contrary to expectation the impact of
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this variable appears to be positive and significant in the dispensing fee equations. In
the percentage markup equations it does carry a negative sign but is significant only in
the second period.
The special interest variables
The special interest variables perform better and have significantly more
explanatory power. With the exception of the Medicaid recipients, the special interest
groups generally have a statistically significant influence on the three dependent
variables.
1. Medicaid recipients as a percentage of the state population has a positive and
significant impact on the percentage markup in both periods of the analysis.
However, contrary to expectation the impact of this variable is negative and
significant in the dispensing fee equations of both periods. The impact on total profit
is not statistically significant. This lack of consistency and significance may be due to
the limited political power and organization that is inherent to this group.
2. The percentage of pharmacists who are members of the APhA was expected to have a
positive impact on reimbursement levels. Accordingly, a strong positive and
statistically significant impact is observed in both the component equations as well as
in the total profit equations. These results suggest that the APhA has been successful
in protecting their members’ interests.
3. The percentage of physicians belonging to the AMA has the expected negative impact
particularly in the second period. An anomalous positive and significant coefficient
was found for the dispensing fee equation in the first period.
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4. The percentage o f the labor force employed by the drug manufacturing industry does
not have a consistent impact. In the first period it is not significant in any of the
equations. In contrast, in the second period it has a positive and significant impact on
the percentage markup component.
Other explanatory variables
1. The percentage of chain pharmacists in the state has a consistent, predicted, negative,
and generally statistically significant influence on all three dependent variables. This
indicates that states have been successful in accounting for the lower average cost
enjoyed by chain pharmacists. The only deviation from this pattern was observed in
the percentage markup equations where the impact was not significant at the
(a = 0.05) level.
2. The states' per capita income was predicted to have a positive impact on the
willingness and ability to support higher reimbursement rates. Larger per capita
income presumably implies increased ability and willingness to support higher
payment levels. The results obtained here do not confirm this hypothesis. An
explanation for this may lie in the structure of the Medicaid program which is a joint
federal-state contract.30 The states’ share of incurred expenditures is calculated as

StateShare =

State Per Capita Personal Income
National Per Capita Personal Income

x 0.45.

(2.12)

A state’s share of expenditures is thus directly related to its per capita income.
Therefore, states with a higher per capita income pay a larger share o f the incurred
expenditures and thus have an incentive to limit reimbursement levels.
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Table 2.7a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable:
Dispensing Fee (1985-1989)._________________________________________
2.4852
0.2809

Perrecirn^xfira^e^r^j&uiies .

0.0018
4.5943
-0.0049
0.0072
0.0040

0.2557
0.3688

0.0009
1.4840
0.0011
0.0023
0.0018

9.72

0.0001

0 .76

0 .4471

2.06
3.10
-4.48
3.13
2.26

0.0410
0.0022
0.0001
0.0020
0.0249

0.0207
-1.65
-0.0341
Tfciginam ^^
-4.27
Percentage cba&pharmac&ts
-0.0103
0.0024
1.73
0.0000
0.0000
Per capita income
Estimates significant at the five percent leve are in boldfaced print.

0.1010

0.0001
0.0856

Table 2.7b: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable:
Percentage Markup (1985-1989).

1
F-*
tn
03

H H B S9H
5.29
Constant
16.5551
3.1308
-0 .04
-0 .1817
4 .4044
Relative budgetsurplus
2.7
Berrecipientdrugexpenthtures
0.0241
0.0089
2
4
.
5
2
6
7
1
5
.
4
9
1
8
Driigsfiare^
M edicaid;fec$«n@ ^pa^(m^
2.16
0.0279
0.0129
Percerit^ei®^ihCTi«rafilpJ:i;
2.84
0.0294
0.0835
-2.23
Percentage AMA membership
-0.0468
0.0210
-0.0977
0.1258
- 0 . 78
Drug manufacturing employm.
0.0228
-0.9
-0.0205
Percentage chain pharmacists
-4.1
Per capita income
-0.0005
0.0001
Estimates significant at the five percent leve are in boldfaced print.

0.0001
0.9671

0.0075
0 .1148

0.0322
0.0049
0.0268
0.4383
0.3692

0.0001

Table 2.7c: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Total
profit ( 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 ).______________ _______________________________
h bbh h h i^ b h
■ N I H illilliM M H
H H O n
| Constant
12.83
46.7106
3.6414
0.0001
12.8366
4.9559
2.59
0.0102
1.48
0.0175
0 .0119
0.1412
Perredpientfdwi^

wmamm

1

19.9507

0 .1 9

0.6685

CO
O
1

0 .4041

Medicaidredpiehts/popWatiori
6.07
Percentege AEhAmenibership 0.0324
0.1966
-0.0204
0.0244
PercentageAMAmembersHip.
0.71
0.2390
0.3380
Drug manufacturing emprbym..
-5.54
Perceritage^£a&^
' V-0.1888
0.0341
-0.0007
-3.52
Per capita.ihcome..
0.0002
Estimates significant at the five percent leve are in boldfaced print.
0.0151

0.8474

1
o
4*
OJ

1

I

S

3 .8430
-0.0065
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Table 2.8a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable:
Dispensing Fee (1990-1994).

1

1

1

IWI

:i \

4.4926

0.5675

7.92

0.0001

0 .4417

0.3776

1.17

0 .2432

-0 .0013

0.0011

-1 .24

0.2174

8.3641
-0.0031
0.0119
-0.0066

1.9044
0.0012
0.0030
0.0029

4-39
-2.63
4.01
-2.27

0.0001
0.0093
0.0001
0.0240

-0 .0195

P C T < » Q ta g & ,c fi^ p fi^ a S s t^ '|
P er capitaincom e
I

-0.0089
-0.0001

0.0190

-1.02

0 .3067

0.0024

-3.75
-3.4

0.0002
0.0008

0.0000

E s tim a te s s ig n ific a n t a t th e fiv e p e r c e n t le v e a re in b o ld fa c e d p rin t.

Table 2.8b: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable:
Percentage markur

10.4437

3.6124

2.89

0.0042

-3 . 3 1 2 6

2.7890

- 1 . 19

0.2362

0.0082

0.0080

1.03

0 .3055

12.5459
0.0077
0.0218
0.0176
0.1706

-4.55
5.09
2.25
-1.96
2.62

0.0001

Percentage AMAfmembersftip
Drug manufacturing employm.

-57.0285
0.0394
0.0491
-0.0345
0.4477

Percentage chaiapharmacists
Per capita income

-0 .0315

0.0162

- 1 . 94

0.0537

-0.0002

0.0002

-1.49

0.1377

Constant.

I

1

1

M edicafddfecfpleB^^

0.0001
0.0254
0.0515
0.0093

Table 2.8c: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Total
profit (1990-1994).

.Constant.

.

49.6113
-0 .4 6 5 8

^ e c i^ ip ie n ia j i^ W u ^
iE g ^ g s ^ g c g @ ® t e a i^ ^ ^ ^
M edicaidreapients/population
PercentageAEhAmembership
^ ercei^ e^ S ^ m C T S em B ife;
;D higm ianufacti&

•j& m m m B tg g m s B m

4.6472
3 .4560

10.68
-0 .1 3

0.0001
0.8 9 2 9

-0.0249

0.0097

-2.58

0.0104

12.4967

16.0472

0 . 78

0.4369

-0.0156

0.0101

-1.55

0.1226

0.0656
-0.0534

0.0281
0.0230

2.34
-2.32

0.0203
0.0213

0.3378

0.1894

1.78

0.0758

-0.0995
-0.0008

0.0204
0.0002

-4.87
-4.12

0.0001
0.0001
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The Medicaid Recipients And Prescription Drug Expenditures Equations
Medicaid recipients
The regression results are summarized below and shown in Tables 2.9a and 2.9b.
1. The median voter variables all carry the expected signs for both time periods, and are
mostly statistically significant. Per capita income has a positive and significant
impact in both periods; the tax price has a negative coefficient, but is significant only
in the second period; the welfare share of the budget, reflecting the median voter’s
tastes for providing service to the poor is positive and significant in the first period;
the percentage of individuals under the age of 21 has a positive influence and is
significant in the second period; and, the percentage of African Americans has a
negative and significant impact in the first period.
2. The demand control variables do not perform as well. The number of individuals
under the federal poverty level has a significant and positive impact in both periods as
expected. The unemployment rate has a negative estimated coefficient in the first
period, but becomes positive and insignificant in the second. Relative benefits also
do not follow the expected behavior.
3. The interest group variables also show mixed results. The per capita hospital beds
variable, used as a proxy for the hospital industry’s influence, has a positive impact.
The coefficient is significant in the first period. The percentage of physicians
belonging to the AMA is significant in both periods, but changes from having a
positive to a negative impact.
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4. The policy variables included in the model were a dummy variables representing the
impact of OBRA 1987 for the first period, and OBRA 1990 in the second period. The
results indicate that neither OBRA 1987 nor OBRA 1990 had a significant impact.
Prescription drug expenditures
The regression results for these equations are discussed below and are shown in
Tables 2.10a and 2.10b.
1. The first group of variables consists of the dependent variables of the preceding
equations. In the first period the dispensing fee, percentage markup, and number of
Medicaid recipients all have a highly significant impact. The percentage markup and
the number of Medicaid recipients both have the expected positive impact on drug
expenditures. However, the results indicate a negative relationship between the level
of dispensing fees and prescription drug expenditures in period one. Diagnostic tests
revealed that the dispensing fee exhibited little variation in this period, causing it to
be highly collinear with the intercept term, and providing, at least in part, an
explanation for this contradictory result. Therefore, more weight is given to the
results of the second period, in which the problem appeared to be alleviated to some
extent. In the second period the dispensing fee, the percentage markup, and the
number of Medicaid recipients are all statistically significant with the expected
positive sign.
2. The drug cost containment policy variables do not have a consistent impact. The
presence of drug formularies and DUR programs does not have the anticipated effect
on drug expenditures in either period. However, states with a larger co-payment
amount do have lower drug expenditures in the first period. This variable becomes
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insignificant in the later period. The weak performance of drug containment policies
may be due to their endogenous nature.31 Perhaps a more fully specified model,
including equations explaining the enactment of these policies, would produce more
agreeable results.
3. The state characteristics also have mixed influences. The percentage of the
population over the age of 65 has a positive and significant impact in the first period,
but is negative and significant in the second. The percentage of AFDC recipients
under age 21 is not significant in either period. The percentage of the population
living in metropolitan areas changes from negative and significant in the first period
to positive and significant in the second.
4. The provider variables perform well: both the per capita pharmacists and per capita
physicians variables have a positive impact, although the former is only significant in
the second period.
5. The non-drug policy variables fluctuate both in significance and sign between the two
periods.
Table 2.9a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Recipients (1985-1989).

N um berof peopl&in poverty
Unemployment rate
Real relative benefits
Per capita hospitalbeds
Percentage.AM&inembersbip
OBRA.1987.

275768.2000

-3.47

3.9242

4.44

0.0001

-3832.2700

2217.6000

-1.73

0.0857

594068.1300

132395.6000

4.49

0.0001

729.4720

662 . 0937

l .l

0.2721

-3302.9500

-2.56

0.1275
-10202.9900

1289.6000
0.0342
2719.6000

0.0113
0.0003
0.0002

-83784.6800

289204.2000

31936.5600
1623.8200
15671.1400

2127.1000
650.9565
6395.8000

3.73
-3.75
to

.

.P e ix ^ ta i;e ^ L p Q k ltm d ^ % ^ 2 1 '; i

-955764.4600
17.4271

1
O

Constant
Per capi&mcbhie
T axpffce '
W elfare sham ofithejnidgrt

15.01
2.49
2.45

Estimates significant at the five percent level are in boldfaced print.
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0.0007

0.7724

0.0001
0.0135
0.0153

-991052.7800
43.6286
-8222.0700
181446.8200

487164.9000
19.3437
3224.8000

2.26
-2.55

0.0434
0.0253
0.0116

0.8

0 .4261

227450.6000

7228.2300

1998.1000

3.62

0.0004

-2943.3300

1881.5000

•1.56

0.1195

12.7

0.6376

0.0502

5722.8300

7024.1000

0.81

-1852998.0100

606420.7000

-3.06

0.0026

6346.6800

3709.3000

1.71

0 .0888

-4773.1900

1797.2000

-1646.5000
18496.5000
OBR&'lSSOr
Estimates significant at the five percent level are in boldfaced print.

0.0001
0 .4163

2.66

0.0086

-0.09

0.9292

-

Table 2.10a: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Log of
Medicaid Prescription Drug Expenditures (1985-1989).
constant
Dispensing Fee
Percentage Markup
Medicaid Recipients
Restricted Formulary
Drug Utilization R eview
Drug Co-payment
Percentage o f pop. age 65+
Percentage AFDC age 21Percentage o f pop. Metropolitan
Per Capita Pharmacists
Per Capita Physicians
Trend
Limits on coverage for HI*1 cases
Medicare principles for HI cases
Limits on skilled nursing services
Prior authorization for ICFMR*2
Limits on physicians’ HI visits
Prior auth. for physicians’ services
Medicare principles physician
Co-payment on physician
Limits on coverage for HO*3 cases
Medicare principles for HO cases

14.2988
-0.1561
0.3665
0.4939
0.4865

0.5879

2432
-3.97
5.52
16.83
4.70

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001

0.1036

0.1075

0.0642

1.67

0.0957

-1.0541

0.1276

-8.26

0.0001

0.0375

0.0113

332

0.0010

-0.0092

0.0063

-1.46

0.1462

0.0393
0.0664
0.0294

0.0001

-0.0126

0.0029

-4.26

0.0001

321.6326

295.3514

1.09

0.2774

1169.8500

181.7862

0.0028

0.0170

6.44J
0.16

0.0001
0.8705

0.6087

0.0839

7.25

0.0001

0.1023

1.27

0.2067

0.2371

0.0808
0.1327

1.79

0.0755

-0.1272

0.0843

-1.51

0.1329

-0.3918
0.1272
0.3323
0.4189
03196

0.0779
0.0622
0.1170
0.1371
0.1104

-5.03
2.05
2.84
3.06
2.90

0.0001
0.0421
0.0050
0.0025
0.0042

-0.1823

0 .1076

-1.69

0.0916

Estimates significant at the five percent level are in boldfaced print. "‘Inpatient Hospital.
"Intermediate Care Facilities Mental Retardation . "3Hospital outpatient
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Table 2.10b: Three stage least squares parameter estimates. Dependent variable: Log of
Medicaid Prescription Drug Expenditures (1990-1994).

Per Capita Pharmacists
Per Capita Physicians
Trend
Limits on coverage for H I cases
Medicare principles for HI cases
Limits on skilled nursing services
Prior authorization for ICFMR
Limits on physicians’ HI visits
Prior auth. for physicians’ services
Medicare principles physician
Co-payment on physician
Limits on coverage for HO cases
Medicare principles for HO cases

11.3211
0.1619
0.1585
0.2124
0.3298
0.2617
-0.0013

0.5387
0.0385
0.0557
0.0105
0.0981
0.0659

21.02
4.2
2.85
2033
3.36
3.97

0 . 0454

-0.03

0.0001
0.0001
0.0049
0.0001
0.0009
0.0001
0.9763

-0.0301

0.0111

-2.71

0.0072

0.0037

0 .00 62

0.59

0 .5533

0.0157
7466.0900
657.7054
0.0590
0.3557
0.1602

0.0023
920.8410
68.2239

6.76
8.11
9.64
2.41
5.5
2.63

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0167
0.0001
0.0092

-0 .1059

0.1304

0.0245
0.0647
0.0610

1
O
C
HD

constant
DispensingjTee
Percentage Markup
Medicaid Recipients
Restricted Formulary
Drug Utilization R eview
Drug Co-payment
Percentage ofp o p . age 65+
Percentage AEDC age 2 1 Percentage of.pop.M etropoIitan

0 .4179

0.1766

0.0843

2.1

0.0373

0.1289

0.0690

1.87

0.0631

0.3447

0.0609

5.66

0.0001

0 .1250

0.0676

1.85

0.0658

-0.0382

0.0458

-0.83

0.4053

0 . 0841

0 .0829

1.01

0.3115

0 . 0442

0.0693

0 . 64

0.5239

Estimates significant at the five percent level are in boldfaced print.
SECTION II.VI: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study investigated the influence of public interest factors and special interest
groups on reimbursement levels of Medicaid covered prescription drugs. Regarding the
former, there is little to no evidence supporting the hypothesis that relative budget
surpluses and the share of states’ Medicaid budgets devoted to prescription drug
expenditures have any impact on reimbursement rates. On the other hand, the results
indicate that states with high per recipient drug expenditures generally support lower
reimbursement rates in the second time period.
Regarding the special interest groups the results indicate that the APhA, in
particular, and the AMA have been successful in representing their members’ interest. As
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predicted, the number of pharmacists belonging to the APhA has a consistent positive
effect on the reimbursement of both the individual components and the total profit
reimbursement levels. The American Medical Association generally has a negative and
significant impact on pharmaceutical drug reimbursements rates, especially in the second
period. Similarly, the results suggest that the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry has
a stronger influence in the second period. In contrast the Medicaid recipient group does
not have a consistent impact on reimbursement levels, probably due to its limited political
and organizational power.
In summary, this study finds that relative strengths of special interest groups, to a
large extent, explain the observed variation in reimbursement levels of prescription drugs
covered by the Medicaid program, particularly in the second period. Pertaining to the
dispensing fee and percentage markup, the elasticity coefficients associated with the
percentage APhA membership variable, calculated at the average values, are (0.074) and
(0.113) in the first period. In the second period these elasticities rise to (0.250) and
(0.590), respectively, indicating increased influence of this interest group. With an
average dispensing fee and percentage markup of $3.00 and 10%, respectively, the second
period elasticities imply that a 10% increase in the strength o f the APhA would result in a
1.13% and 5.9% increase in the dispensing fee and percentage markup, respectively.
Using an average drug price of $23.28 in 1994 and the approximate total number of drugs
processed in that year, (385,845,921), this would increase expenditures by an estimated
$13 million and $46 million, pertaining to dispensing fees and markup, respectively. This
clearly demonstrates the impact that interest groups have on legislation and expenditure
levels.
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At the creation of Medicaid the federal government established a minimum level
of services (both mandatory and optional) which must be covered under state run
programs.32 The argument for federal control was to ensure some equality regarding the
medical treatment o f the poor across the nation. Recent trends in the majority republican
congress, however, indicate growing support for transforming AFDC into a block grant
provided by the federal government to the states. The block grants would be based
inversely on the states’ per capita income, similar to the FMAP, providing states with the
power to operate and finance their own programs.
A great deal of the existing literature has been devoted to explaining the observed
variation in the coverage of services and the treatment of the poor under Medicaid across
states.33 The poor are not treated uniformly as pertaining to medical services provided by
the Medicaid system.34 One implication of a shift in the balance of power from the
federal government to the state level could be a rise in the influence of interest groups
and, consequently, an increase in the existing disparities in the treatment of the poor
between states. This argument is further supported by the median voter model applied in
the recipients equation. The tastes and preferences of the median voter at the state level
have significant and consistent explanatory power regarding variation in the size of
programs across states.
Drug reimbursement policies which determine per drug expenditures have a
significant impact on aggregate drug expenditures. With the emphasis on the second
period of the examination, states with higher dispensing fees and percentage markups
have, on average, higher total drug expenditure budgets. This analysis also showed that a
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strong relationship exists between the relative strengths of interest groups and the level of
prescription drug reimbursements.
Consistent with the results obtained by others the results indicate that formularies
do not have the intended effect on drug budgets.35 Similar results are found for Drug
Utilization Review programs and co-payments on physician services. On the other hand,
a co-payment on drugs appeared to have generated some savings during the first period.
In the second period, however, this variable becomes highly insignificant.
An interesting result from this analysis is the changing relationship between per
capita income when considered at different levels of Medicaid programs. At the “ground
level” of state decisions regarding the size of the program, concerning eligibility
requirements, states with higher per capita incomes support larger groups of individuals.
The states’ ability and willingness to support larger numbers of the poor is linked to their
per capita income. However, once eligibility requirements have been established and the
focus is directed at financing the program, the relationship changes to a negative one. At
the financing level a state’s share of the cost varies directly with its per capita income,
providing incentives to limit per recipient spending.
The changing structure of the equations, discussed in section HI, is highly visible
in the regression results. On the one hand, the influence of the APhA and AMA appeared
to be consistent, in sign and significance, and growing over time. However, on the other
hand, the impact of a substantial number of variables fluctuates both regarding statistical
significance and the direction of their influence, particularly in the recipient and aggregate
drug expenditure equations, reflecting dramatically changing attitudes and politics
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surrounding the Medicaid program. Any future study, dealing with the same time period,
should take this structural change into account, particularly regarding empirical analysis.
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CHAPTER ID
ALTERNATIVE REIMBURSEMENT METHODS AND MEDICAID HOSPITAL
EXPENDITURES
SECTION DI.I: INTRODUCTION
Hospital inpatient services have historically claimed a relatively large percentage
o f the nation’s medical outlays. Nationally, 35.4 percent of all health care expenditures
were devoted to hospital inpatient services in 1995. For the Medicare and Medicaid
public health programs the percentages of outlays devoted to hospital services were 48.2
and 24.0, respectively1. Regarding Medicaid, inpatient hospital expenditures have
claimed a relatively large proportion of total outlays since the inception of the program
(Table 3.1). The data in Table 3.1 also shows the growth rates in inpatient hospital
expenditures indicating large fluctuations over time. The average real growth rate during
the latter half of the 1970s was 3.8 percent, dropping to 0.5 percent during the 1980s.
The 1990s were also marked by large fluctuations, with average growth rates of 11.6 and
-3.4 percent, respectively, from 1990 to 1992 and 1993 to 1996.
Given the relative size of hospital inpatient budgets, control over this component
of medical care is crucial in states’ endeavors to subdue the growth of Medicaid
expenditures. With this goal in mind, provider reimbursement methods became an
important issue almost immediately following the adoption o f this program. This is the
first of two papers investigating to what extent the adoption of different provider
reimbursement methods have been responsible for the observed periodical declines in
Medicaid inpatient hospital expenditures.
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Table 3.1: Medicaid payments in real (medical care price index) 1982-1984 millions of
dollars for general inpatient hospital services (1975-1996).

rw m z
i
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1985
1982
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

:

$25,773

$7,103

27.6

27,098
28,489
29,113
30,329
31,123
32,815
31,783
32,198
31,733
32,920
33,375
34,593
35,048
36,406

7,510
8,004
8,078
8,378
8,561
8,678
8,292
8,760
8,285
8,230
8,392
8,640
8,826
8,883
10,201
11,201
12,323
12,749
12,367
11,899
10,669

27.7
28.1
27.7
27.6
27.5
26.4
26.1
27.2
26.1
25.0
25.1
25.0
25.2
24.4

5.7
6.6
0.9
3.7
2.2
1.4
-4.4
5.7
-5.4
-0.7
2.0
3.0
2.2
0.6

(1975-1979)
3.8

25.7
25.8
25.7

14.8
9.8
10.0

(1990-1992)
11.6

25.3
24.2
21.9
20.6

3.5
-3.0
-3.8
-10.3

39,748
43,381
48,036
50,421
51,067
54,370
51,689

(1980s)
0.5

(1993-1996)
-3.4

Source: Health Care Financing Administration, Form 2082.
Prior to 1983, hospitals which participated in public health programs were
primarily reimbursed for the reasonable cost of services rendered to covered patients. The
inefficiencies inherent in the fee for service (FFS) or “retrospective” provider
reimbursement approach have been widely discussed in the literature.2 Since
retrospective payment amounts are based on incurred costs they do not provide any
incentives toward economizing of medical resources. This cost based approach was
recognized as inflationary, prompting Congress to authorize broad based experiments and
demonstration projects to determine the feasibility of alternative reimbursement methods.
These experiments were originally directed toward the Medicare program.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

52

“In 1967, section 402(a) of Public Law 90-248 delegated authority to the secretary
to experiment with alternative methods o f reimbursement —specifically, incentive
reimbursement. This authority was further broadened in 1972 under section
222(a) o f the Social Security Amendments of 1972 (Public Law 92-603). Under
these amendments, prospective reimbursement methods were devised and tested
for their ability to stimulate providers through positive (or negative) incentives to
use their facilities or personnel more efficiently and thereby to reduce the total
costs o f the health programs involved without adversely affecting the quality of
services ...”3
The experiments were not limited to public health programs and shortly thereafter
several states began using prospective payment methods for the reimbursement of
hospital costs. Some states had comprehensive systems encompassing virtually all payer
types, while others only affected reimbursement from selected sources. However, the
common goal was to reduce the growth of hospital expenditure levels by directly
regulating prices and costs. States which enacted hospital rate setting laws expected to
have lower expenditure levels.4,5,6 Following more than a decade of debate, the 1983
Amendments to the Social Security Act, provided for a prospective payment system
(PPS) based on diagnosis related groups (DRGs) for short-term hospital inpatient services
rendered to Medicare patients. This PPS involves all Medicare patients throughout the
nation.
Medicaid reimbursement to providers had also traditionally been based on FFS
methods. As was the case with Medicare, Congress demonstrated an interest in
encouraging experimentation with alternative reimbursement methods regarding
Medicaid. To facilitate this OBRA 1981 (Section 2173) made it easier for states to
experiment and adopt alternative payment systems. In addition to prospective payment
methods, states also adopted direct utilization controls in their attempt to reduce the
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growth of hospital outlays. Similar to prospective payment, the goal of these controls is
to discourage over utilization o f services and to promote efficiency and cost effectiveness.
The 1980s witnessed a steady increase in the number of states adopting
prospective payment systems (PPS). By 1989, 43 states had adopted a form of a PPS.7
At the same time, however, state Medicaid hospital inpatient outlays generally continued
to rise. Growth rates in real Medicaid general hospital inpatient expenditures are shown
in Table 3.1. Given the continued increases in both hospital inpatient and overall
Medicaid budgets, state agencies began experimenting with managed care, hoping to
capitalize on the associated financial incentive systems which have proven successful in
the private sector. From 1991 to 1996 the number of states which had Medicaid
recipients enrolled in some managed care program increased from 33 to 49. The average
recipient participation in managed care programs, including only states with positive
enrollment, increased from 88,961 in 1991 to 255,730 in 1996.8
Regarding Medicaid the federal government gave states considerable discretion
over the implementation and administration of hospital cost containment policies,
resulting in fifty four differently structured programs.9 This discretion includes the
methods and standards utilized for reimbursing participating providers. An interesting
question, arising from this legislative and bureaucratic diversity, concerns the decision
making process behind the adoption of a given reimbursement method. This paper
examines the factors which determine why some states adopted the different types of
PPSs, direct utilization, and managed care programs concerning the reimbursement and
delivery of hospital services by Medicaid.
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The importance of understanding this decision making process is twofold. First,
the initial intent of the Medicaid program was to provide medical services to the nation's
poor in an efficient and equitable fashion, and in the quantities and qualities generally
observed in the private sector. The nature of the decision making process may shed some
light on whether this goal has been compromised at the state level. Second, private sector
third party payers often follow the policies of state Medicaid programs. The remainder of
this section discusses the prospective payment, coverage limitation methods, and
managed care programs which states have adopted in their attempt to contain Medicaid
hospital costs. Section three explores the theoretical model and the variables employed to
explain the adoption of those policies. Following that, section four briefly discusses the
data, data sources, and econometric methods employed in the estimation. Section five
presents the empirical results, followed by a summary and discussion of policy
implications.
Prospective Payment Systems (PPS).
Under PPSs reimbursement rates are determined by the state prior to the delivery
of services. The state generally establishes a reimbursement rate for a base year using
data on the average cost of providing medical services. An inflation adjustment is made
for subsequent years. Participating providers receive this pre-specified reimbursement
rate for each unit of service regardless of the cost of actual resources used. Hospitals
which provide services at a cost below the prospective payment realize a profit, while
those that have costs exceeding the fixed payment suffer a loss. This creates powerful
financial incentives for providers to minimize costs by emphasizing efficient methods of
treatment and by reducing utilization of inputs. Indeed, the switch from a cost based to a
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prospective payment system, based on diagnostic-related groups (DRGs)10, has been
associated with decreased use of hospital inputs in the case of Medicare.11 Within the
Medicaid system, the goals o f a PPS are to curb the rate of increase in the unit price of
services, reduce the rate of increase in overall expenditures for hospital services, and to
eliminate inequities among hospitals.
Medicaid agencies are employing any combination of three different forms of
prospective payment systems. The first is called a rate-of-increase control system, under
which providers are paid a fixed rate, either per day or per case, generally based on the
institutions’ average costs. States using this method typically impose a rate ceiling, and
make adjustment based on the type or location of a particular facility. Furthermore,
adjustments for inflation are applied periodically. Thus, the payment rate can be
expressed in functional form as
p ,= P ( c ,t,l)

(3.1)

where p, is the prospective payment rate, c is the average cost of the institution, and t and
/ represent the type and location o f the institution.
The second form is referred to as a prospective case-mix system, where payment
rates are based on patients’ diagnoses. This PPS has received the most attention in the
literature, perhaps because it was adopted as the method of payment regarding short-stay
hospital care for the Medicare program in 1983.12 Each hospital inpatient is classified
according to a particular DRG which has an associated weighing factor. The weight
reflects the concentration of hospital resources used for providing care to the average
patient in that DRG, calculated across all hospitals. Multiplying an associated weighting
factor by a predetermined rate yields the reimbursement rate to the provider. The

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

56

predetermined rate can vary according to institution or type of institution, for example
based on size, urban versus rural location, or teaching status. The PPS payment per
discharge may be represented as
Pi = [(w x j)+ o ]x (l + a )

(3.2)

where p: is the PPS payment per discharge, w is the DRG weight, s is a standardized
payment amount, o represents a potential outlier payment, and a represents a hospital
adjustment factor.Ij
There is crucial difference between a rate-of-increase control and DRG based
system: in the former the prospective rate is determined starting with the particular
institution’s average cost, while, in the latter, the rate is determined starting with a
national or state average cost. Clearly, the former provides more flexibility in rates.
Furthermore, states implementing rate-of-increase controls may not impose limitations on
the number of inpatient days. Thus, losses resulting from higher than average use of
resources could be offset by increasing the number of inpatient days.
Third, states may use a negotiated PPS where institutions make competitive bids
to obtain a “license” to participate in the program. Recipients must use “licensed”
providers in case of non-emergencies. Negotiated PPS has not been widely embraced by
states and will, therefore, not be considered in the empirical analysis. Indeed, in 1992
Delaware was the only state to employ this PPS.14
Direct utilization control
Another policy option available to states is to impose direct controls on the
utilization of hospital services. Utilization controls may take the following forms:
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1. Limits on inpatient days per year implying a fixed maximum number of days
which will be covered annually by Medicaid per recipient.
2. Limits on inpatient days per stay which may be fixed or varied according to
the diagnosis.
3. Prior authorization in the case of non-emergency admissions. According to
this policy hospitals will not be reimbursed for “discretionary” admissions for
which no prior authorization was obtained from the Medicaid agency.
4. Prior authorization for specific services. This is similar to point three but
applies only to certain elective procedures.
Table 3.2: States which utilized a prospective payment system in 1994.

Alabam a
Arkansas
C alifornia
Colorado
*
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
G eorgia
H aw aii
Iow a
Idaho
Illinois
*
Indiana
Kansas
K entucky
Louisiana
JVfassachusetts
M aryland
M aine
M ichigan
*

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Health Care Financing Administration spDATA System.
*States which utilize both a DRG based and a rate of increase control approach. In this
year there were 39 PPS states, 10 of which used both approaches. (Table Con’d.)
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Table 3.2: Continued

Yes
Yes
Yes

MSiasEisr

Yes

.

NoT^^CTarcrtina

Yes
Yes

N ebraska
N ew H am pshire*

mssaBsmmm-:
OKio"'

;*

O klahom a
O regon
Pennsylvania
RHo^e-Lilahd
S o u lfcd M b lin a *
SonthrJ)akota
T eM essee
Texas
U tah
*
V irginia
V erm ont
W ashington
W isconsin
*
W ntV irein& r

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes.
Yes.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Utilization controls are also designed to curb per recipient spending, for example by
limiting the number of days a patient remains in the hospital. Notice, that severe limits,
particularly per case limits, could discourage hospitals from serving Medicaid patients
resulting in fewer recipients as well. On the other hand, prior authorization is clearly
directed at reducing the number of recipients. Table 3.2 indicates whether a state
employed a PPS or direct utilization control in 1994.
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Managed care
State Medicaid agencies employ three types of managed care programs:15 (1)
those which reimburse providers on a FFS basis, generally referred to as primary care
case management (PCCM); (2) those which utilize networks of physicians who are paid
on a “capitated” or “financial-risk” basis; and (3) those which enroll Medicaid enrollees
in health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Observe that the term PCCM is
sometimes used as encompassing all three types of programs. In this paper it will be used
to refer to programs which reimburse participating providers on a FFS basis. Under
PCCM participating providers act as gatekeepers to the medical care received by
enrollees. The providers are reimbursed retrospectively for services rendered and
ordinarily receive an additional fixed periodical payment, usually monthly, for each of
their enrollees. This approach does not provide the financial incentives which are
generally associated with prepaid managed care but instead relies on enhanced continuity
of care to generate long-term savings.16, 17
Under managed care, participating providers, generally existing HMOs or other
prepaid health plans (PHP), receive a fixed amount per patient for a given time period,
regardless of the amount of resources actually devoted. This severing of the link between
reimbursement amounts and incurred costs constitutes the “risk” of prepaid managed
care. Institutions which manage to provide for their enrolled patient group at an average
cost below this fixed payment will enjoy a profit. Conversely, those which have an
average cost above the fixed payment suffer a loss. This generates powerful financial
incentives for participating providers to minimize the utilization of resources.
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S E C T I O N f f l.n : T H E M O D E L

Legislation regarding the Medicaid program, particularly concerning matters of
reimbursement levels and methodologies is an important determinant of hospital inpatient
expenditures. Previous research indicates that PHPs and utilization controls have reduced
Medicaid and Medicare hospital spending. In a multivariate analysis, using various
combinations of prospective reimbursement and utilization control, Zuckerman (1987)
showed that, concerning Medicaid, these policies are indeed associated with lower per
recipient spending, and, in case of the latter, reductions in recipients as well.18 Custer et
al. (1990) also provides evidence that prospective reimbursement methods have been
successful in decreasing the use of hospital inputs in the case o f Medicare. The evidence
for savings generated by managed care is also plentiful in the empirical literature.19 In
light of this empirical evidence, combined with the overwhelming theoretical cost
containment arguments in favor of PPSs and managed care, one may question why
Medicaid agencies have been reluctant to adopt these policies.
Theoretical framework: special interests, public interests and the median voter
Legislative outcomes have been explained by two main theories. The economic
theory of legislative decision making emphasizes the role o f interest groups which
demand legislation that benefits them. According to this view, groups which are, or
potentially would be, affected by particular legislation are willing to pay a price to
influence the outcome. The price may be expressed in terms o f campaign contributions,
volunteer time, or the promise of favorable votes during future elections.20
For example, provider groups are unlikely to be indifferent between prospective
and retrospective cost based systems. Furthermore, this method, while not primarily
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directed at reducing the number of inpatient recipients, could also result in fewer
Medicaid cases if rates were set prohibitively low. Medicaid recipients would become a
liability to hospitals, which would then be reluctant to serve this group. Therefore, the
adoption of a prospective payment system is likely to be the product of, among other
variables, the interaction of the affected provider and recipient groups.
Alternatively, legislators may make decisions based on their perceptions of the
public interest. Accordingly, interventions in industries result largely from the public’s
demand for legislative action. Factors such as existing budget pressures may be
significant in this respect. The median voter model, which argues that legislation is based
on the preferences and tastes of the median voter, has been used to explain the provision
of public services. In the context of public health, this model describes taxpayers as utility
maximizers who derive satisfaction from the consumption of goods and services as well
as the transfer of income to welfare recipients. The quantities of consumption goods and
services and public goods are determined by maximizing the following objective function
subject to a budget constraint:
m a x U [ X , W , Z ) s.t. Y = P , X + P„W

{.*■.»■}

( 3 .3 )

where X is the quantity of Medicaid services provided and Px is the tax price to the
median voter of an additional unit of service provided.21 W represents a composite
bundle of goods and services, with price Pw, consumed by the median voter, and Z is a
set o f exogenous factors which influence the median voter’s preferences for W ox X.
Model Variables
The following is a description of the special interest, public interest, and median
voter variables employed in the model.
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Interest group variables
There are several interest groups which could be affected by legislation
concerning Medicaid hospital expenditures. Groups which share common objectives will
likely cooperate with one another, while those with opposing goals will compete against
each other in the lobbying process. The resources that each group is willing to allocate
toward obtaining their goals will depend, among other factors, on the potential gains or
losses from specific legislation.22 Some of these groups, such as hospitals and physicians
will be affected directly, while others will notice the impact indirectly. The following
groups have been identified as having either a direct or indirect interest in Medicaid
related hospital reimbursement policy.
•

Hospitals. This group is expected to oppose any legislation directed towards limiting
reimbursements to hospitals. Spending or hospital revenue caps, for example, would
impair hospitals’ ability to expand and increase their services, and may even result in
financial difficulties. The strength of hospitals is measured in terms of the size of this
industry approximated by the per capita hospital beds.

•

Physicians. Any approach which reduces or freezes physician’s charges, directly or
indirectly, will likely result in a fall in physicians’ incomes. Furthermore, inadequate
payments for Medicaid patients, restricting hospitals’ ability to hire additional
personnel or implement new technologies and facilities, would also diminish
physicians’ productivity. Physicians are, therefore, expected to favor higher
payments for Medicaid hospital patients and oppose prospective payment approaches.
The political influence of physician groups is represented politically by the percentage
of physicians who are members of the American Medical Association (AMA).
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•

Insurance companies. Although they did not use these groups in their empirical
analysis, Feldstein and Melnick identified insurance companies, unions, and the aged
as having an interest in lower hospital costs.23 Hospitals which receive inadequate
payments for Medicaid or uninsured patients will attempt to compensate for this by
shifting the cost to private pay patients.24 The cost of the bulk of such private pay
patients is covered by private insurance companies. Inadequate Medicaid payment
levels could result in increased prices charged to non-Medicaid patients and,
consequently, force higher premiums charged by private insurance companies.
Private insurance companies are, therefore, expected to support higher Medicaid
payments for inpatient recipients. The influence of this groups is measured in terms
of the percentage of private citizens with private insurance.

•

Labor unions. A similar argument applies to labor unions. Lower insurance
premiums imply savings from health care benefits, which may translate into increases
in other fringe benefits or wage rates received by union members. These groups are
therefore also expected to favor increased Medicaid payments to hospitals. The
percentage o f the labor force which is represented by unions is used to capture the
influence of this group.

•

Recipients. The existing empirical evidence indicates that prospective payment
methods reduce per case hospital expenditures. Lower payment levels may result in
fewer resources, such as time and elective diagnostic testing, devoted to Medicaid
patients. Furthermore, sufficiently low reimbursement levels will make Medicaid
patients a liability which hospitals will attempt to avoid, resulting in fewer recipients
served. In the case of direct utilization controls, such as a requirement of prior
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authorization, the evidence indicates a reduction in the absolute number of
recipients.25 Recipient groups are therefore expected to oppose these alternative
reimbursement and cost containment methods.
Medicaid recipients, however, generally belong to low income groups possessing
neither the resources nor the disposition for political organization.26 Legislators can
afford to ignore the interests o f these groups in the decision making process. For this
reason, this group is not expected to have a strong impact on legislative decisions
regarding prospective payment and direct utilization control.
Another notion which may affect the influence of the recipient population variable
is the tradeoff between quantity and quality. Medicaid agencies may decide to cover a
large population but limit the expenditures per recipient. Alternatively, they may
enhance the services offered to individual recipients but limit the size of the eligible
population. Thus, states servicing a larger Medicaid population may be more inclined
to limit per recipient expenses by adopting PPS or utilization controls. The recipient
group is represented by the number of recipients to population ratio.
Public interest variables
The following variables are used to capture the public’s interest in Medicaid
legislation.
I . Budget pressures. States’ decisions to enact cost containment policies may reflect
budget pressures. States which are experiencing large relative budget deficits, for
example, are expected to be more likely to adopt legislation aimed at reducing costs.
The state's relative budget deficit is defined as,
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_ , . _ ,
_ _ .
state revenues - state expenditures
Relative Budget Deficit = ----------------------------------------state revenues
•

The tax price. The price to the median voter at the state level is determined by the
federal Medicaid assistance percentage (FMAP), calculated as

StateShare =

State Per Capita Personal Income
National Per Capita Personal Income

: 0.45

(3.4)

The higher the federal government’s share the smaller the incentive of the median voter
will be to adopt prospective payment systems or enact coverage limits on hospital
inpatient services. A negative relationship is expected between the FMAP and the
probability of states adopting cost containment policies.
•

The percentage of AFDC recipients under the age of 21. The median voter is
hypothesized to have a higher preference for providing public goods to children.
Therefore, the percentage of AFDC recipients under the age of 21 is included in the
model.27 A negative impact on the probability of PPS or coverage limits is expected.

•

The percentage of African American recipients. Conversely, the median voter is
expected to have a lower preference for providing public goods to minorities. To test
this hypothesis, the percentage of African American recipients is included in the
model. In this case the probability of PPS or coverage limits is expected to rise with
this variable.

•

Welfare outlays. Current welfare outlays as a percentage of the state’s budget is
used to measure the median voter’s overall tastes and preferences for providing public
goods. Higher percentages are hypothesized to indicate a favorable disposition

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

66

toward the provision of public goods. In such states a lower probability of cost
containment and utilization control is expected.
•

Political ideology. In addition to the cost of taxation and budget pressures the
prevailing political ideology is hypothesized to play a role in the decision making
■70

process." It is generally believed that a more liberal sentiment favors public welfare
programs such as Medicaid. To capture the effect of the dominant political ideology,
the percentage of congressional democratic representatives in the state is used.
Democratic representatives generally have more liberal views and are assumed to
favor higher outlays for public welfare programs. In the context of this paper, the
probability of establishing PPSs and direct utilization controls and managed care
enrollment would be negatively related to the percentage of representatives who are
democrat.
•

Inter party competition (IPC). A second political variable which has been
hypothesized to effect public programs is the amount o f competition among parties."9
When a high degree of competition exists among parties, political candidates will
reach out to the relatively uncommitted poor by promising better benefits.
Consequently, the marginal power of the recipient group increases, which may imply
a lower probability of cost containment measures being implemented. The EPC is
constructed at the state level by considering the composition of the lower and upper
houses and the gubernatorial office in each state. First, an index of democratic
dominance is constructed as

(3.5)
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where G,D = 1 if a democratic governor is in office, or zero otherwise; i f and I, are,
respectively, the number o f democratic electives and the total number o f seats in the
lower house; and U° and Ul are, respectively, the number of democratic electives
and the total number of seats in the upper house. Thus, D, ranges from zero toone.
Extreme values would indicate total dominance by one party.

An indexof 0.5 would

imply an evenly divided representation and, therefore, a high degree of competition.
The IPC index is constructed as
fA

if a £ 05

IPC = | ( l - A) if A > 0 i

(3'6)

generating a number between 0 and 0.5, where increasing values imply increasing
competition.
SECTION ffl.ffl: DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS
The data consists of a cross section of 47 states and a time series of six years/0
Data sources include annual publications of Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) forms 2082 (recipient) and 64 (financial), the Medicaid spData system by the
HCFA, the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1985 - 1997), Medical, Practice Data
by Census Division. State, and County Group by the American Medical Association,
Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs by the National
Pharmaceutical Council (1985-1997), EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits by the
Employee Benefit Research Institute, data collected by Professor William J. Moore at
Louisiana State University on American Medical Association membership, and data
collected by Professor Barry Hirsch at Florida State University on the extent of state
unionization.
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The endogenous variables are as follows:
1. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses a PPS based on DRGs.
2. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses a PPS based on rate-of-increase
controls.
3. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses direct utilization controls.
4. the percentage o f the Medicaid population enrolled in any type of managed care.
5. the percentage o f the Medicaid population enrolled in risk-based managed care
programs.
The first three equations are estimated using a probit procedure. The fourth and fifth
equations are estimated using the tobit estim ator/1 Particularly in the case of capitated
managed care enrollment a large number of observations have a zero value for the
endogenous variable, resulting in a censored sample. Ordinary least squares is, therefore,
no longer consistent or efficient. Data on managed care enrollment was not available for
years prior to 1991. The fourth and fifth equations can therefore be estimated for the
1991 to 1996 period only. For ease of comparison the remaining equations are also
estimated for the latter six years.
SECTION m.IV: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results o f the regressions are shown in Table 3.3. Each column contains the
results of either a Probit or Tobit regression for one of the five dependent variables: the
use of a DRG based PPS, rate-of-increase control PPS, coverage limits, the overall
percentage of managed care enrollment, and the percentage o f capitated managed care
enrollment.
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Table 3.3: Regression estimates

8.1028
(3.44)

-4.9643
(-2 3 4 )

1.4396
(1.67)

-0.3390
(-0.38)

0.4578
(0.50)

171.8769
(2.40)
15.4291
(5.77)
89.0711
(2.79)

-0 .0932
(-1.10)

0.3211
(4.10)

-0.0383
( - 0 .53)

-4.5845
(-1.68)

-0.0063
(-1.04)

-0.0055
(-0.92)

0.0008
(0.12)

-0.0065
(-0.03)

853692
(2.27)
-23.1675
(-5.07)
0.6094
(2.18)

-0.0167
(-0.85)

0.0313
(1.76)

-0.2591
(-0.43)

0 .2114
(0.28)

-0.0927
(-4.57)
21.7838
(4.81)
-0.0586
(-332)
-0.0561
(-3.87)

0.0471
(2 3 3 )
-9.2868
(-3.40)

0.0905
(3.91)
-0.0720
(-334)

0.4923
(0.76)

1.1319
(1.48)

1.6428
(0.69)

14.6708
(0.16)

-251.013
(-1.75)

0 .0271
(1.78)

0.0115
(0.71)

0.0127
(0.96)

-0.0432
(-3.15)

-0.9453
(-1.82)
-1.7434
(-3.87)

-2.0036
(-3.01)
-2.6716
(-4.91)

0.0050
(0.98)

-0.0129
(-2.54)

0.0024
(0.41)

-0.2224
(-1.32)

0.01
(0.05)

-4.2451
(-2.97)

-1.9269
(-1.74)

-0.5624
(-0.47)

-115.8138
(-3.00)

94.0626
(1.77)

In terparty com petitioniridex

-1.1995
(-1.49)

1.8303
(2.38)

1.0912
(1.31)

-38 .237
(-1.46)

-30 .6947
(-0.94)

Percentage dem ocratic
representatives

0.0058
(1.54)

0 .0030
(0.81)

0.0138
(3.44)

0.2412
(1.96)

0.2257
(1.47)

i0 D lis fiu ^

-6.0410
(-2.42)

Treriff
D e fic it '

■

; . ;.v; ■
.

PercentageAM A

FederalM edicafdA ssistance
Percentage:
Percentage AFDC a g e 21 and
less:
Percentage A frfcan Am erican
W elfare share debudget

*

250.6532
(2.91)
5.1714
(1.53)

Coefficients which are significant at either the 1 or 5 percent level are in bold: aced print.
Prospective payment systems based on Diagnosis Related Groups
The adoption of a DRG based PPS is mainly determined by the median voter
variables. All special interest variables have the predicted influence but are generally not
significant. The estimates imply that labor unions, in particular, were successful in
protecting their members’ interests. Better funded public health inpatient programs
reduce hospitals’ need to shift costs to the privately insured. The estimated positive
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coefficient associated with the recipient to population ratio variable indicates that states
with large programs are more likely to adopt this cost containment measure.
Regarding the median voter variables, the larger the share of expenditures funded
by the federal government, implying a lower tax price, the less likely the adoption of this
cost containment policy. Furthermore, the median voter was hypothesized to have a
higher preference for providing public health care to children and a lower preference to
support minorities. Accordingly, higher percentages of AFDC recipients under the age of
21 and higher percentages of African Americans are, respectively, associated with lower
and higher probabilities o f states using a DRG based PPS to contain costs. The welfare
share of the state budget was used to measure the median voter’s disposition toward
supporting public health programs. Supporting this hypothesis, the estimated
coefficients indicate a lower probability of a DRG based PPS when the welfare share of
the states’ budget is relatively high. The inter-party competition index and the political
ideology of the state, measured in terms of the percentage o f democratic representatives,
do not have a statistically significant impact on the probability of a DRG based PPS.
Rate of increase controls
In comparison to the first equation, the special interest variables perform
differently. The percentage of AMA membership and the percentage of the population
covered by private insurance variables remain insignificant. The hospital and union
variables, however, are statistically significant with a positive influence.
An explanation o f this seemingly contradictory result may lie in the differences
between these two types o f prospective payment systems. Rate-of-increase control
systems allow for more flexibility in reimbursement rates (see Section I)- Regarding the
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adoption of a PPS, interest groups face choices at different stages. At the first stage a
choice must be made whether to support or oppose the alternative reimbursement system.
If a group opposed to prospective payment is successful in blocking its enactment the
process stops after this stage. The second stage represents a situation where the adoption
of a PPS is imminent and a choice must be made regarding the type of system. At this
stage, groups which are opposed to PPS are hypothesized to continue to lobby against the
system which represents the most harm to their interests. To test this hypothesis an
auxiliary Probit regression was executed including only states using a PPS, to examine
the choice of system providing that a switch was made to prospective payment. The
results, shown in the appendix to this paper, indicate that hospitals, private insurance
groups, and unions favor rate-of-increase control over DRG based systems in this choice.
In contrast with the first regression, states with high recipient to population ratios
tend to have a lower incidence of this type of PPS. Also contrary to the predictions made
in Section II states with a larger percentage of African American recipients have a lower
probability of adopting this PPS.
The public interest variables appear to have little impact on the adoption of rate of
increase policies. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient associated with the welfare
share of the budget, measuring the median voter’s disposition toward public programs, is
negative (although significant only at the 10 percent level) as expected.
Coverage limitations
The model does not explain the use of coverage limits well. With the exception
of the percentage o f AFDC children under 21 years o f age, the estimated coefficients are
generally either insignificant or contrary to expectations. This is likely the result of
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limited variation in the dependent variable. As shown in Table 3.2 an overwhelming
majority of states employ coverage limits.
Managed care
Regarding managed care, existing budget pressures, measured by the states’
relative budget deficits, are highly significant and carry the predicted sign. The results
also indicate that the hospital interest group has been successful in protecting its
members’ interests in the case o f capitated managed care. Contrary to expectations,
however, the estimated coefficient associated with AMA membership is positive.
Regarding the median voter variables, states with a lower tax-price, indicated by a higher
FMAP, tend to have lower percentages of recipients enrolled in managed care.
Furthermore, states with higher percentages of AFDC children have statistically
significant lower enrollment. Finally, the welfare share of the state budget, measuring the
median voter’s disposition toward public programs, exhibits the predicted effect in the
overall managed care enrollment equation.
SECTION HI.V: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The analysis has shown that Medicaid state hospital cost-containment policies are
influenced by both interest group and median voter variables. To the extent that these
policies differentially impact Medicaid hospital services and expenditures, we can expect
discrepancies in the treatment o f Medicaid recipients across state borders. If public
interests were driving these policy changes, one could at least argue that the public
interest is being served. In many cases, however, policies are influenced by provider
group interests. The quality and cost of Medicaid hospital care across the states will vary
depending on the relative strength of interest groups as well as taxpayers’ generosity.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTROLLING MEDICAID INPATIENT HOSPITAL EXPENDITURES
SECTION IV.I: INTRODUCTION
Modem medicine and hospitals, along with physicians, are nearly synonymous in
the minds of most Americans. Indeed, it is often difficult to imagine one without the
other. Modem hospitals represent large concentrations of sophisticated medical
technologies, highly specialized physicians, ancillary services, support personnel, and
recovery rooms. Given this concentration, and the potentially lifesaving nature of the
“goods” and “services” which are inherent to the health care industry, it is perhaps not
surprising that hospital services claim a disproportionately large share of the nation’s
medical expenditures. Pertaining to the Medicaid program the inpatient hospital share of
expenditures has traditionally been one o f the largest, claiming approximately 25 to 30
percent o f all outlays (see Figure 4.1).
Clearly, controlling hospital costs is crucial in the struggle to reduce the growth in
the nation’s health care budget. Regarding the Medicaid program, efforts to control costs
have been shaped by the structure o f the program. The Medicaid program is part of Title
XIX of the Social Security Act o f 1965. It is a joint Federal/state funded program which
provides health care related services to the poor. To maintain a degree of equity,
regarding the services provided, the Federal government provides some fundamental
guidelines for state Medicaid agencies to follow. Within these guidelines, however,
states have substantial flexibility. In particular, “each of the states:
1. establishes its own eligibility standards;
2. determines the type, amount, duration, and scope of services;
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3. sets the rate of payment for services; and
4. administers its own program.” 1
Family Planning (0.5%)
Dental (1%)
Other Practitione
Lab/X-ray

O ther Care (6%)

Hospital Inpatient (26%)

Hospital Outpatient
Home Health Care (7%)

Physicians (7%)

ICF - Mentally Reta
Pharmaceuticals (8%)

Nursing Facility/Services (25%)

Figure 4.1: Makeup o f the national Medicaid program, 1994. Source : Health Care
Financing Administration, Form 2082.
This flexibility causes considerable variation among state Medicaid programs. Pertaining
to services which are offered (point two), the state may influence expenditure levels by
manipulating eligibility standards and payment rates (points one and three).2
The provision of inpatient hospital services is determined by numerous factors
interacting in a complicated system of cause and effect. In compact notation
(4.1)
where Ht is the level o f Medicaid inpatient hospital expenditures in state “f \ G,
represents a vector of government policy variables which are endogenously determined,
and X, is a vector of exogenously determined control factors. Within the context of
inpatient hospital expenditures the policies which G, is comprised of are:
a) Direct control over prices and utilization and, as a policy goal, costs. This type of
policy became popular during the late 1970s and remains an essential tool today. In

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

81

particular, direct control can be exercised by the adoption of either prospective
payment systems (PPS) or coverage limitations.
b) Market driven managed care. Although the notion o f managed care existed since the
beginning of the twentieth century it was not widely used by Medicaid agencies until
the 1990s.3 One important distinction between this approach and direct control is that
States are attempting to capitalize on the financial incentive structures associated with
prepaid health plans already developed in the private sector.
c) Indirect control through the manipulation of eligibility standards. This variable
controls the size of the demand population and, consequently, expenditure levels.
In addition to G„ equation (1) includes a vector, X„ of exogenously determined
factors. The variables in this vector may be grouped into the following categories: (1)
supply side, (2) substitute and complementary services, (3) non-hospital cost control
strategies, (4) demand and socioeconomic factors, (5) special interests, (6) federal
policies.
Using a simultaneous equations approach, this paper examines the relative roles
played by the policy choices. In particular, this paper compares the relative successes of
the direct and the more market oriented cost control approaches. Figures two and three
show the percentages of state Medicaid budgets devoted to inpatient hospital
expenditures, indicating substantial variation both across states and over time. In 1986,
for example, nine states had inpatient hospital expenditures claiming over 30 percent of
their overall Medicaid budget. The number of states in this category declined to three in
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7(NH)
30.4(MA)
•30.4(RI)
3(CT)
7(NJ)
3(MD)
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30 (29)
20 ( 12 )
10 ( 1 )

Figure 4.2: Percentage of the Medicaid budget devoted to general inpatient hospital
expenditures, 1986. Source : Health Care Financing Administration, Form 2082.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of the Medicaid budget devoted to general inpatient hospital
expenditures, 1995. Source : Health Care Financing Administration, Form 2082.
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1995, while the number of states with inpatient hospital expenditures in the 10 to 20
percent range almost doubled from 12 to 23 in that same time period. Section II discusses
the theoretical framework o f the model, followed by a description of the variables used in
the empirical analysis in section IE. Section IV describes the data, data sources, and
empirical methods used, and sections V and VI provide the empirical results and a
general discussion.
SECTION rV.II: THEORY

Direct Government And Market Driven Cost Containment Policies
Direct hospital cost controls
The inefficiencies inherent in the traditional FFS or “retrospective” provider
reimbursement approach have been widely discussed in the literature.4 Opponents of
retrospective payment systems argue that it encourages, or, at least does not discourage,
over utilization of services, since payment amounts are based on the incurred costs of the
care provided. In addition to encouraging managed care principles, the passage of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981 (Section 2173) has also led to a
steady increase in the number o f states adopting “prospective” payment systems (PPS).3
With prospective payment, reimbursement rates are determined prior to the
delivery of services and are independent of the actual quantities of resources used.
Hospitals delivering care at a cost below the predetermined payment level enjoy a profit.
On the other hand, hospitals with costs exceeding the prospective payment level suffer a
loss. PPS provides a powerful incentives for provider institutions to reduce the utilization
of resources. Medicaid agencies introduced PPS to control costs by directly controlling
prices.
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There are three types o f Medicaid PPSs: diagnosis related group (DRG) systems,
rate-of-increase control systems, and negotiated systems. Use o f a negotiated PPS is rare
and will not be considered in this research; only the state of Delaware employed this
method in 1992.6 Under a rate-of-increase control system providers are paid a fixed rate,
either per day or per case, generally based on the institutions’ average costs, typically
subject to a ceiling. Furthermore, adjustments for inflation are applied periodically. The
third PPS has received the most attention in the literature, perhaps because it has been the
method of reimbursement for Medicare short-stay hospital services since 1983.7 This
PPS is commonly known as a prospective case-mix system, according to which payment
rates are based on patients’ diagnoses. Each hospital inpatient is “grouped” according to
a particular DRG which has an attached weighing factor determining the typical amounts
of resources required for treatment. Multiplying an associated weighing factor by a
predetermined rate yields the reimbursement rate to the provider.
In addition to PPSs designed to regulate prices and costs, some states impose
direct controls on the utilization of hospital services. These direct utilization controls
may take the form of
1. Limits on inpatient days per year implying a fixed maximum number of days
which will be covered annually by Medicaid per recipient.
2. Limits on inpatient days per stay which may be fixed or varied according to
the diagnosis.
3. Prior authorization in the case o f non-emergency admissions. According to
this policy hospitals will not be reimbursed for “discretionary” admissions for
which no prior authorization was obtained from the Medicaid agency.
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4. Prior authorization for specific services. This is similar to point three but
applies only to certain elective procedures.
Medical care delivery strategies
Partly in response to steady post World War II increases in the share o f the
nation's wealth devoted to health care, prepaid health plans (PHP) have become
increasingly popular. This approach’s ability to generate savings over the FFS system in
the private sector has been widely analyzed8, and its use in Medicaid has recently gained
momentum. Through the application of waivers OBRA 1981 encouraged states to adopt,
among other cost-saving measures, PHPs with wide discretionary authority regarding
their implementation.
A closely related concept, which encompasses PHPs, is Medicaid Primary Care
Case Management (PCCM). Under this approach to managed care, a primary care
provider is the patient’s first point of contact into the system. This characteristic, by
itself, is expected to generate savings.9 Managed care is generally associated with more
continuity in the delivery of care for individual patients, resulting in several desirable side
effects, such as increased patient and provider satisfaction, improvements in patient
attitudes, more expeditious and proficient recognition of medical problems, fewer
laboratory tests and procedures, fewer illness visits, fewer emergency room visits, and
potentially reduced inpatient use.10
Hurley, et al. (1993) distinguish between three types of Medicaid PCCM
programs: (1) those which reimburse providers on a FFS basis; (2) those which utilize
networks of physicians who are paid on a “capitated” or “financial-risk” basis; and (3)
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those which enroll Medicaid enrollees in health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
Intuitively, the second and third types have a greater ability to generate savings.
Control Variables
The supply of hospital services, substitutes and complements
Several theoretical models have been developed to explain the dynamics of
hospital costs, generally focusing on not-for-profit institutions because of their
prominence in the industry. Although they do not concentrate on the delivery of
Medicaid hospital services, in particular, they do, to a large extent, provide insight into
that segment of the industry as well. These models focus on the supply side of hospital
services, the logistics of which are assumed to be identical whether the demand originates
from a Medicaid or a non-Medicaid patient. When applied to Medicaid, however, the
outcomes predicted by these models may be skewed to the extend that they assume outof-pocket payments by patients. Medicaid recipients are generally fully covered by the
program. Concerning the decision making process, particularly regarding the quantity
and quality of services rendered, these models may be roughly divided into those which
assume a larger degree o f control either in the hands o f an administrative body or the
medical staff.
Millard Long (1964), Melvin W. Reder (1965), Joseph Newhouse (1970), Martin
Feldstein (1971), and Maw Lin Lee (1971) are examples of the former, assuming
somewhat similar objective functions and constraints for hospitals. Long, for example,
discusses a model in which hospitals attempt to maximize quantity, referred to as the
guiding principle of their behavior, subject to a budget and quality constraint. Reder
describes the hospitals’ goal as achieving a careful balance between the availability of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

87

resources, such as beds, and the number of patients admitted. Newhouse and Feldstein
explore a model in which the objective function contains both the quality and quantity of
care, which are maximized subject to a budget constraint. In Lee’s approach the hospital
administration attempts to maximize a general utility function, containing such variables
as salary, prestige, security, power, and professional satisfaction. In addition he also
considers types of physical capital in the objective function.
On the other hand, Reder (1965) also points out that physicians, as managers of
the production of health care services, have substantial influence regarding the demand
for, and the supply of, hospital services. Using this notion as a starting point, Mark
Pauly and Michael Redisch (1973), and Jeffrey Harris (1974) emphasize the decision
making role which physicians fulfill concerning the day to day operations of a hospital.
Pauly and Redish assume that hospital affiliated physicians enjoy control over hospital
facilities at any point in time. In this framework, physicians can enhance the quality of
their product by combining it with hospital services. In his description of the “split”
organizational structure o f hospitals, Harris points to the necessity of “decentralized”
decision making. The physician acts as an agent who decides which patients are
admitted, how long they will stay, and what inputs they will receive.
Supply side factors, therefore, are essential in determining the level of inpatient
hospital expenditures under Medicaid, or any other payment program. As numerous
authors have pointed out, one of a hospital’s goals is to minimize the number of empty
beds. Furthermore, the role of physicians, particularly hospital affiliated, is to
complement their services with those encountered in a hospital. On the other hand, as
was empirically investigated by Miller (1988), office based physicians’ services and
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outpatient hospital services, for example, may act as substitutes for inpatient hospital
services.
Demand and socioeconomic factors
Health is perceived of as a durable good, or a type of capital, from which
individuals enjoy a flow of services. According to this notion, developed by Michael
Grossman (1972), this flow of services is consumed by individuals during their
lifetimes.11 Each individual is bom with an initial endowment of a stock o f health, which
is subject to depreciation and augmentation. Depreciation may stem from such factors as
aging or incidences of illness. Augmentation may originate from a healthy lifestyle or an
investment in medical services. Thus, starting with an endowment at the beginning of a
given period, say a year, people can augment their stock of health. The demand for
medical services is, therefore, interpreted as derived from the demand for health. The
second set of variables that effect expenditure levels are related to the demand side of the
industry. Aside from the size of the population the demand for health, and therefore the
demand for medical services, varies with specific socioeconomic factors, such as sex and
age.
Interest groups
Legislation regarding the Medicaid program, particularly concerning matters of
reimbursement levels and methodologies, are important determinants of inpatient hospital
expenditures. Legislative outcomes have been explained as outcomes of a function
containing public interest and special interest factors. The former claims that
interventions in industries result largely from the public’s demand for legislative action.
Alternatively, the economic theory of special interests argues that legislation is demanded

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

89

by groups with related interests.12, u 14,15 Groups which would benefit, or lose, from
particular legislation have an incentive to exercise their influence in the decision making
process. Hospitals and physician interests, for example, will be affected directly by
legislation regarding reimbursement methods or the freedom to recommend and provide
the treatment deemed most appropriate for an individual patient. Clearly, any analysis of
Medicaid hospital expenditures must account for the impact of the interaction between
these groups and the legislative process.
Federal policy
The Medicaid program is a joint federal/state program which provides medical
care to the nation’s poor. At its creation the federal government established a minimum
level of services, both mandatory and optional, which must be covered under state run
programs.16 The argument for federal control was to ensure some equality regarding the
medical treatment o f the poor. Within this framework the federal government has
continued to affect the scope of the program, for example through changes in eligibility
requirements which are passed down to the states.
SECTION IV.HI: MODEL VARIABLES

Hospital cost containment policies consist of prospective payment methods,
utilization controls, and managed care enrollment. A detailed discussion of these
variables is presented in the preceding essay “Alternative Reimbursement Methods And
Medicaid Hospital Expenditures.” The decision to adopt cost containment policies is
treated as endogenous. States which experience budget pressures, perhaps due to high
Medicaid expenditures may be more likely to adopt cost containment measures. If this is
the case, the results may incorrectly indicate a positive relationship, for example,
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between the use of PPS and inpatient hospital expenditure levels. Furthermore, the
presence of special interests and the preferences of the median voter are likely to affect
the support for such alternative systems. It is, therefore, clear that the enactment of a PPS
should be treated as endogenous.17 By treating the decision as endogenous the effects of
the latent factors which determine whether a state adopts a PPS are entered into the
model.
Industry supply, substitute, and complementary characteristics
•

Per capita hospital beds. This variable provides a measure of hospitals’ capacity
and, albeit crudely, the probable availability of facilities. States with high beds to
population ratios are more likely to have excess capacity. Affected hospitals would,
presumably, have more relaxed policies regarding the admittance of Medicaid
patients. A significant positive relationship between available hospital beds and
expenditure levels may indicate evidence for the induced demand hypothesis,
according to which providers can stimulate demand to minimize excess capacity or to
mcrease mcome.

1ft

Per capita beds, as opposed to the total number of beds, is used

because of severe multicollinearity between the latter and the number of Medicaid
recipients in the state. The per capita beds variable is defined as
, , hospital beds (x 1000)
per capita beds = ---.
state population
•

Hospital based physicians in patient care. This sub-set of physicians has easy
access to hospital services at any point in time to complement and enhance the quality
of their own product. Thus, the larger the percentage of hospital based physicians, the
more hospital services will be used and the higher expenditure levels will be.
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•

Office based primary care physicians in patient care. A separate measure for
private (non hospital based) physicians, particularly the percentage of physicians who
are general practitioners, is included to account for the differences regarding their
interaction with hospital facilities. The services provided by this subset of physicians
are hypothesized to be substitutes to inpatient hospital services. Surgeons and other
hospital based physicians are more likely than general practitioners, who are usually
more independent and versatile, to induce increased inpatient hospital care.19 An
increase in the supply of, and, consequently access to office based general
practitioners’ services should, ceteris paribus, reduce utilization of inpatient hospital
services.

•

Medicaid physician, outpatient hospital, and other services. Different Medicaid
services are not provided independently o f one another. Since Medicaid recipients
generally do not have any out-of-pocket expenses, they will likely seek the most
effective and comprehensive type o f care as their first choice. If the first-choice
service becomes restricted due to federal or state policies, demand for such services
will likely be diverted to substitute services. Regarding inpatient hospital services,
for example, the empirical literature has demonstrated a complementary relationship
with physician, outpatient hospital, and clinic services.20 In an analysis examining the
interaction between physician and inpatient services in the Medicare system, Miller et
al., 1997 find that this relationship is particularly strong from physician to hospital
services, while a weaker relationship exists in the opposite direction.21
In addition to the general supply side substitute and complementary factors
employed in the model, several non-hospital cost containment variables are tested as
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well. Successful policies which are designed to reduce utilization of substitute and
complementary services should have, respectively, positive or negative impacts on
inpatient hospital use. Observe that these policies are treated as exogenous with
respect to inpatient hospital expenditures even though their enactment is determined
by individual state Medicaid agencies. The following non-hospital cost containment
control policies are included; if the state
1. has limits on the coverage of outpatient hospital services.
2. uses Medicare principles, or prospective payment, for the reimbursement of
outpatient hospital services.
3. has limits on the coverage of skilled nursing facility services.
4. has limits on mentally retarded intermediate care facility services.
5. has limits on physicians’ inpatient hospital visits.
6. requires prior authorization for certain physician services.
7. uses Medicare principles to reimburse physician services.
Demand and socioeconomic variables
•

Recipients. States have wide discretion regarding the eligibility requirements which
individuals must meet to qualify for Medicaid covered benefits. As such, states may
use this source of control to limit or expand the eligible population, and,
consequently, the recipient population, depending on the fiscal context. The number
of recipients in any particular year is, therefore, assumed to be endogenously
determined.22

•

Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Since it was first recognized in
1981, the number of cases of the most severe form of the Human Immunodeficiency
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Virus (HIV), AIDS, increased steadily throughout the 1980s and most of the first half
of the 1990s. The treatment of this deadly disease is relatively expensive, with
estimates of lifetime medical care costs ranging from a low of $38,00023' 24 to a high
of approximately $147,000.25
The incidence of this disease has three potentially important implications
pertaining to Medicaid inpatient hospital expenditure levels and the variations in
those expenditures across states. First, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) estimates the proportion of AIDS patients who depend on Medicaid for their
medical needs to be approximately 40 percent. This relatively high percentage is not
likely to decline considering that the disease’s victims are generally poor, lack private
insurance, and are too young to qualify for Medicare. Second, relating to variations
between states, AIDS cases are relatively concentrated in only a few states.
Approximately 35 percent o f all reported cases in 1994 are from California and New
York alone. This percentage rises to 60 percent when the next three states with the
highest number of reported cases, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey are included.26
Third, providing that an AIDS patient meets the eligibility criteria of a particular state,
inpatient hospital services may be most accessible given that their coverage is
mandatory under Medicaid. Other services which are important to AIDS patients, but
are often restricted or not available, include prescription drugs, community health
services, dental services, and personal care services.27 Such services, if available,
could act as substitutes for inpatient hospital services. To account for the impact of
this disease on state expenditures, a dummy variable was constructed to represent
these five states.
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•

Percentage female. A large proportion of hospitalizations under Medicaid involve
pregnancies, especially following OBRA 1986 and 1987 (see discussion concerning
eligibility expansions in the federal policy section below). To account for this, the
percentage o f eligibles who are female is included in the model. A positive
relationship is expected between this variable and inpatient expenditures.

•

Family size. The care o f a family member may not be a perfect substitute compared
to that received from a medical professional, but it is personal, generally punctual,
and associated with lower time costs. Furthermore, the cost of child care during
hospital visits increases with the number of dependent children in the family.
Leibowitz, et al. tested this hypothesis and found that eligibles belonging to families
of size three or larger tend to use less care.- Given the absence of this data at the
state level, the impact o f family size is approximated by the average size of
households in the states. A negative relationship is expected.

•

Percent metropolitan population. To control for any differences in demand for
services which may exist between urban and rural areas, the percentage of the states'
population living in metropolitan areas is included in the model. There are two
important reasons why hospital expenditures are expected to be higher in urban versus
rural areas. First, urban institutions generally maintain more technologically
advanced equipment and, therefore, on average attract more medically demanding
patients. Second, hospitals, and therefore, hospital services are generally more
plentiful in urban areas, reducing recipients’ time costs. This will likely result in
higher utilization rates in metropolitan areas. However, to the extend that alternative
forms of care, particularly ambulatory care, are more accessible in metropolitan areas
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than in more sparsely populated regions, a substitution effect toward such alternatives
may reduce inpatient hospital expenditures. The net effect of these factors is expected
to be positive.
•

Percentage o f population age 65 and over. Individuals that reach the age of 65 are
automatically covered by Medicare. To account for the effects of Medicaid recipients
transferring between public health programs, the percentage of the population over the
age o f 65 is included in the analysis.

Interest groups
Hospitals are expected to oppose any legislation directed towards limiting
reimbursements for inpatient services. The influence of hospitals is represented in this
model as a supply side factor by per capita hospital beds (defined above). Spending or
hospital revenue caps, for example, would impair hospitals’ ability to expand and
increase their services, and may even result in financial difficulties. The special interest
undertones of this variable reinforces the expectations o f a positive correlation with
expenditure levels.
In addition to hospitals, physicians have been identified as having a direct interest
in matters which affect inpatient expenditure levels. Inadequate payments for Medicaid
patients, restricting hospitals’ ability to hire additional personnel or implement new
technologies and facilities, would also diminish physicians’ productivity. Physicians are,
therefore, expected to favor higher payments for Medicaid hospital patients. In addition
to the percentage of hospital based and general practice physician variables defined
above, the percentage membership of the American Medical Association in each state is
used to account for a more direct political influence. Because only a small percentage of
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physicians treat a large number of Medicaid patients, this variable is not expected to have
a large impact on hospital expenditures.
Federal policy variables
•

Eligibility expansions. During the latter half of the 1980s state and federal
governments made several changes in legislation, severing the traditional link
between AFDC and Medicaid eligibility. Most notably were provisions in OBRA
1986 and 1987 which were directed at enhancing care for pregnant women and
infants. Realizing the long term health and financial benefits of proper, early, and
regular prenatal care, both the individual states and the federal government initiated
campaigns to encourage pregnant women to seek eligibility. Furthermore, efforts
were made to recruit and retain medical providers, particularly obstetricians.29
Starting in 1988 these policies resulted in substantially increased annual recipient
growth rates among pregnant women and children.30 To account for these policies a
dummy variable to indicate years starting with 1988 will be included in the model.

•

The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider Specific Tax Amendments
of 1991. Originating out of 1981 legislation, and encouraged by Congress and the
HCFA between 1985 and 1988, Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments
were designed to help public and non-profit hospitals which serve a proportionately
high number of Medicaid and uncompensated care patients. The high proportion of
such patients prevents these hospitals from shifting costs to private pay patients as
their counterparts are capable of doing.31,32 However, DSH payments quickly became
entangled in special revenue enhancing schemes which were designed to raise federal
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funds for state Medicaid programs without appreciable increases in “real” state
contributions.
For example, West Virginia and Florida were among the first states to establish
provider specific tax and voluntary donation programs (T&D). Under these programs
the state taxes providers or receives voluntary donations from providers, which are
typically returned as increased reimbursement Medicaid payments. These payments
are, subsequently, matched by the federal government based on the Federal Medicaid
Assistance Percentage (FMAP).j3
An alternative method used to increase revenues from the federal government
involves Inter-Governmental Transfers (IGT). Similar to T&Ds, IGTs are taxes from
local governments or hospitals which are transferred to the Medicaid agency. These
taxes are then used as payments to contributing institutions, for example as a DSH
payment. Again, these payments must then be matched by the federal government
based on the FMAP/4 effectively shifting the financial burden to other states.
Consider a state whose share o f Medicaid expenses is 50 percent'35. Suppose the state
collects $50 million from an imaginary medical institution and returns a Medicaid
reimbursement payment of $60 million. The state, consequently, receives $30 million
in FMAP payments, which translates into a $20 million net gain, while the institution
enjoys an increase in funds of $10 million. The federal government suffers a $30
million cost, which is, consequently, dispersed among all 50 states. This net gain can
be used to maintain or enhance current programs in the state. It must be noted that
these special financing practices result in an unfortunate side effect of artificially
inflating inpatient hospital expenditure measures. In the example above, the state
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would report an increase in hospital expenditures of $60 million, whereas the true
increase is only $10 million.
The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider Specific Tax Amendments,
which are aimed at reducing states’ ability to acquire federal funds, are represented by
a dummy variable with a value of one starting with 1992. The amendments limit the
federal matching payments on funds acquired from T&Ds by
1. “essentially banning provider donations.
2. Capping provider taxes so that provider tax revenues could not exceed
25 percent of the state’s share of Medicaid expenditures.
3. Imposing provider tax criteria so that taxes were ‘broad-based’ and
providers were not ‘held harmless.’
4. Capping State DSH payments at roughly their 1992 levels.’06
A weakness of the amendment is that it concentrates on T&Ds but largely ignored
IGTs. Nonetheless, it is expected to reduce hospital expenditures.
SECTION IV.IV: DATA AND ESTIMATION
The data consists of a cross section of 47 states and a time series of 12 years (1985
to 1996).37 A large part of the data was obtained from annual publications of HCFA
forms 2082 (recipient) and 64 (financial), and from the agency’s Internet site.
Socioeconomic data was acquired from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Other significant sources include Medical, Practice Data bv Census Division, State, and
County Group by the American Medical Association, Pharmaceutical Benefits Under
State Medical Assistance Programs by the National Pharmaceutical Council, EBRI
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Databook on Employee Benefits by the Employee Benefit Research Institute, and data on
unions collected by Professor Barry Hirsch at Florida State University.
To maintain adequate degrees of freedom, missing observations for the number of
physicians for three years (1988, 1991, and 1995) were extrapolated by using the averages
of adjacent years. A similar procedure was used to extrapolate data regarding the
percentage of individuals in poverty, the percentage of the population which lives in
metropolitan areas, and the average payments made to AFDC families for 1996. Given
that the distributions of these variables across states do not exhibit significant variation
from year to year, extrapolation should not affect the results.
Also, the data for the rate-of-increase control dummy endogenous variable was
not completely acquired. Values prior to 1988 and after 1994 were extrapolated under the
assumption that 1988 and 1994 values were representative of previous and following
years. Furthermore, the results concern the latent factors which lead to the adoption of
this policy. These factors were likely to be present some years before and after the
implementation o f a related policy.
Equation (1) presented a general equation of inpatient hospital expenditures as:
(4.2)
where G\ and X, represent vectors of endogenously and exogenously determined
variables, respectively. The vector G\ includes five latent endogenous variables, defined
as the cost-containment sentiment in the state. As a result of the influence of these latent
variables one observes the following: (1) whether a state has adopted a DRG based PPS;
(2) whether a state has adopted a rate-of-increase control based PPS; (3) whether a state
employs inpatient hospital utilization control policies; (4) the percentage of enrollees in
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managed care; and (5) the number of recipients in the state. Thus, the full model consists
of six equations:
y. =

y2Y 21

+ ^ >

4.

+ ^ 5 * 7 5 . + t 6Y6i

+

+ e.

1 if y , > 0
0 otherwise
1 if y 3 > 0
0 otherwise
1 if j>4 > 0
0 otherwise

(4.3a)

(4.3b)

(4.3c)

(4.3d)

(4.3e)

y 6 ~ X 6$ 6 + e 6

(4.3f)

Where, y, is inpatient hospital expenditures, >’2 indicates whether the state uses of a DRG
based PPS,j/3 indicates whether the state uses a rate-of-increase control PPS, y 4indicates
the use of direct cost containment policies, y 5 is the percentage of recipients enrolled in
managed care, and ^represents the number of Medicaid recipients. The “starred”
variables represent the latent factors which yield the values of their “non-starred"
counterparts. The X xrepresent (N x Kt) matrices of the exogenous variables of each
equation, the (3, are (K , x l) vectors of unknown parameters associated with the
exogenous variables, the y, are scalar unknown parameters associated with the
endogenous variables, and the s, are the error terms.
To estimate the parameters of this simultaneous equations system, which includes
continuous, dichotomous, and censored endogenous variables, a two stage estimator is
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employed. Using the Probit estimator for equations (3b), (3c), and (3d), the probabilities
that y: = /, y 3 = I, andy4 = 1 are estimated to generate instruments to be used in equation
(3a). Similarly, the predicted number of recipients (equation 3f) is used as an instrument
for y 6. The predicted values of the percentages o f enrollees in overall and capitated
managed care was obtained through a Tobit estimator/ Since a state will have managed
care enrollees only if it has a Medicaid managed care program, the distribution of this
variable is necessarily censored, implying that OLS estimates would neither be consistent
nor efficient.
Considering the combination of continuous, dichotomous, and censored
dependent variables in the model, the distribution of the estimator is unknown. The
conventional standard errors could therefore not be used to make inferences. The
bootstrap method described in Appendix B was used to reduce the bias and provide more
reliable standard errors.39
Unfortunately, the study period had to be divided into two parts since data on two
important variables, particularly managed care enrollment and the sex of Medicaid
recipients, is not available for years prior to 1991. Furthermore, F-tests for structural
breaks, using the remaining variables, indicate a changing parameter vector around that
time period. A dummy variable model indicated that the structural break is not system
wide, but is, in fact, limited to only a few variables. The sensitivity of the coefficients is
tested by estimating the model for several time periods, 1985 to 1996, 1985 to 1990, and
1991 to 1996. The 1991 to 1996 model was estimated separately with two different
specifications of the managed care variable: overall enrollment and enrollment in
capitated plans.
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SECTION IV.V: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 4.1 contains the results of the regressions. Each column corresponds to a
different regression, either based on the time period or included variables:
A. Time period 1991 to 1996, executed with managed care variable “overall managed
care enrollment.”
B. Same time period as regression A, but, using managed care variable “enrollment in
capitated managed care,” to test the hypothesis that risk based plans produce larger
savings.
C. Time period 1985 to 1996. This regression, using the full period, was executed to
examine the long term effects of the variables. Most variables are not affected by the
structural break; therefore associated coefficients keep their traditional interpretation.
D. Time period 1985 to 1991. This regression was executed to examine the sensitivity of
the coefficients over time.
The Impact O f Endogenous Policy Variables
Managed care
States with higher percentages of their Medicaid population enrolled in managed
care programs have significantly lower inpatient hospital expenditures. Both managed
care variables are significant. Surprisingly, the coefficient on capitated enrollment is only
slightly higher, although much more significant as indicated by the associated t-statistic.
The first specification included FFS-based managed care which relies on enhanced
continuity of care to generate long-term savings. Note, however, that Medicaid recipients
generally remain eligible to receive care covered by the program for an average o f only a
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few months to a year. Eligibility for Medicaid tends to be transitory, a characteristic
which does not complement the objective of enhanced continuity of care.40
Table 4.1: Regression results.

DveraUmanagedcaie enrollment

18.0784
(15.3986)
-0.0042
(-2.3452)

18.8558
(23.1741)

19.0120
(52.2809)

18-3901
(32.4670)

-0.1643
(-7.8675)
-0.1838
(-4.5645)
-0.0997
(-2.5766)
0.1438
(8.8555)
-0.4692
(-17.0698)
0.0256
(8.8057)
0.0008
(27.3651)
0-3286
(5.5494)

-0.1386
(-5.1276)

-0.1158
(-1.0958)

-0.0045
(-5-3725)
-0.2353
(-5.2145)
-0.2069
(-3.1199)

-0 .0583
(-0.9737)

0.0398
(0 . 8 3 8 3 )

Percapita Hospital beds

0 . 0681
(1.3748)

0.0188
(0.5273)

Pexcent^qfoffi^baseiiggeD^

-0.5495
(-7.1002)
0.0258
(3.4802)
0.0006
(11.5396)
0.3651
(2.6681)

-0.5835
(-11.1517)
0.0278
(35.4813)
0.0006
(17.6535)
0-3988
(4.2722)

Percentage offemale redpfehts-

1.9090
(1.7084)

1.3628
(1.7496)

Average family size

-0.8743
(-2.8403)

Percentage metropolitan
population.
PercentageAM A membership

0.0035
(1.1240)

-0.9497
(-4.5903)
0.0041
(1.9299)

-0.7099
(-6.1631)
0.0043
(3.7044)

0.0037
(1.2660)

0.0010
(0.3249)
-0.0097
(-0.6395)

-0.0004
(-0.2547)
-0.0086
(-0.8347)

-0 .0005
(-0.4231)

-0 . 0012
(-0.6049)

-0.0344
(-8.2067)

-0.0359
(-6-3622)

-0.0653
(-1.8141)

-0.0377
(-1.3765)

-0.2236
(-6.9622)
0-3912
(9.0967)
0.1794
(3.4273)
0.1639
(4.4032)

0-3871
(7.2257)
0.2039
(3.6384)

e n r o l l m e n t . ,v -Y..~iLd
Prqspectiyepa^
based.odDRGs- ■
Pro^ec^&paypa^lystmbasedon rate-of-increase control
Coverage limitations

p r a c titf iin H S ^ ^

Parentage’^
physicians
Medicaid recipients
ReportedAIDS casesdummy .

Percentage of thepopulation age
65 and older

-0.1083
(-1.4955)

O BRA1987

VoLcontribiitiph^provider
specifictax.ameridments <>£1991
Physician cbrpaymait’ .’ r

-0.0679
(-0.8033)

(0.2856)
2.3837
(0.5335)
2.0429
(0.2476)
2.4516

-0.1926
(-3.8908)
0.2931
(3.6771)
0.5212
(2.9334)
0.2150
(3.1522)

-0.0874
(-1.3336)

-0.1948
(-4.8171)
0.2152
(7.8452)
-0.4769
(-12.3760)
0.0183
(3.6090)
0.0009
(20.7193)
0.2137
(2.5756)

-0.5695
(-3.1769)

Coverage lini^'(m stdUdtnDapap^
facility services
0 .0559
Coveragelimits on intermediate
(
0.3111)
carefacility services
t-values are in parentheses. Estimates which are significant at the five percent level are in
boldfaced print. (Table Con’d.)
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Table 4.1: Continued

(-0.3459)
-4.1527

-0.2986
(-5.0913)

(-0 . 0055)
-0.0663

-0.0085
(-0.1503)

-0.1988
(-6.2477)
0.1235
(4.0659)

-0.1080
(-2.0714)
0.1466
(3.8596)

(0.0039)
0.0374

0 .0639
(1.0530)

-0.0370
(-1.0435)

-0.0286
(-0.7452)

(0.2141)
2.7225

0.2149
(4.0447)
-0.1083
(-2.0143)

0.2454
(4.0659)

0.2006
(3.8328)

-0.0366
(-1.0435)

-0.0288
(-0.2908)

(-0.0621)
-0.7985

DRG based PPS
States which have implemented a DRG based PPS generally also have
significantly lower inpatient hospital expenditures. In equation A, which employs the
overall specification of managed care enrollment, the estimated coefficient remains
negative but is statistically insignificant. The decrease in significance is likely the result
of the collinearity between overall managed care enrollment and the use o f DRG and rateof-increase control PPSs, making it statistically difficult to separate the individual
impacts of these variables. Because o f this more weight is given to the estimates from the
second equation.
Rate-of-increase control based PPS
A similar pattern in the significance of the estimated coefficients is found between
the DRG and rate-of-increase control based PPS variables. Again, the collinearity
between these variables and overall managed care enrollment is suspected to be the cause.
There is also an interesting pattern in the absolute sizes of the coefficients o f the PPS
variables over time. Comparing the coefficients associated with DRG and rate-ofincrease control variables between equations D, C, and B, a clear upward trend is
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apparent. This provides evidence that larger savings are achieved as alternative
reimbursement programs mature.
Coverage limitations
The estimated coefficients associated this variable indicate that states which
imposed coverage limitations enjoyed significantly lower expenditures only before 1991
(equations C and D). The lack of significance in the 1991-1996 equations is due to the
limited variation in this variable across states during this period. As indicated in Table
4.2, most states have employed coverage limitations in the 1990s, causing this variable to
be highly correlated with the constant term. Based on the 1985-1990 equation we
conclude that coverage limitations do significantly lower inpatient hospital expenditures.
The Impact O f The Control Variables
The supply of hospital services, substitutes, and complements
The predicted effect of the per capita hospital beds, measuring availability, is
significant only in regressions C and D. This provides limited evidence for the supplier
induced demand hypothesis. The estimated coefficients for the percentage o f office based
general practitioners and the percentage of hospital based physicians indicate,
respectively, substitute and a complementary relationships with hospital services. States
which have a higher percentage of general practitioners enjoy lower hospital
expenditures, and, most likely lower overall medical outlays considering the lower cost
associated with office based care.
Besides office based physician services, the estimates also indicate a substitute
relationship between inpatient hospital services and skilled nursing facility services,
intermediate care services, certain physician services, and hospital outpatient services.
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States which limit the coverage of these services have higher inpatient hospital
expenditures, indicating that the excess demand created by these policies is diverted to
the hospital component. On the other hand, as expected, a complementary relationship
exists between inpatient hospital services and physician inpatient hospital services.
Table 4.2: States which utilized a prospective payment system in 1994.

. ATaKaniar

"r

C alifornia
.C olorado
*
Connecticut
'D elaw are
Florida
G eorgia
H aw aii
Iow a
Idaho
.Illin ois
*
SnM na^
G uns
K entucky
Louisiana
M assachusetts
M aryland
M aine
?Michigan.
*
M innesota
M issouri
M ississippi
M ontana
N orth Carolina
N orth Dakota
N ebraska
N ew H am pshire*

•Newias:;'"--''''
N ew Y ork
*

.

.

.

Yes
Yes
Yes

.

Yes
.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
.

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

.

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

.

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Health Care Financing Administration spDATA System.
*States which utilize both a DRG based and a rate of increase control approach. In this
year there were 39 PPS states, 10 of which used both approaches. (Table Con’d.)
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Table 4.2: Continued

O hio.
Oklalioiina

*

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

.

•„

•TeriiMylvaiua.
iS f io S e lliiS v
South Carolina*
South D akota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah.
*
Virginia
V erm ont ......
W ashington
W isconsin
*
W est V irginia

Yes
Yes

.

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

.

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Y es

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

•

Yes

Demand and socioeconomic factors
The demand and socioeconomic variables all have the predicted impacts. The
predicted number of recipients has an expected strong positive impact on expenditure
levels; states with a large number of reported AIDS cases have significantly higher
inpatient hospital expenditures; the percentage of female recipients, although generally
not significant at the 5 percent level, is associated with higher expenditures; states with
higher average households have lower expenditures; and, larger metropolitan populations
are associated with higher expenditures for hospital services. Also, as the percentage of
the population over the age of 65 increases, indicating a shift from Medicaid to Medicare,
expenditure levels under the former program fall.
Federal policies
Concerning federal policies, the Voluntary Contribution and Provider Specific
Tax Amendments of 1991 are associated with lower inpatient hospital expenditures.
These amendments essentially discouraged the use of special revenue enhancing
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strategies, which some states used to increase the flow of federal funds for their Medicaid
programs. The results indicate that the amendments were successful. On the other hand,
the OBRA 1987 dummy variable was neither significant nor did it have the expected
positive influence on expenditure levels. This may be because of the presence o f the
recipients variable.
SECTION IV.VI: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Regarding cost control, the results indicate that states have a variety of effective
options in their arsenal. Capitated managed care and prospective payment systems,
including both DRG and rate-of-increase systems, are all associated with reduced
inpatient hospital expenditures. Using the estimated coefficients from regression B,
approximate annual savings were calculated.41 On average, States which employ a DRG
or rate-of-increase control PPS enjoy, respectively, $31 and $26 million lower annual
general inpatient hospital budgets. Concerning capitated managed care, a one percentage
increase in the number of eligibles enrolled in capitated managed care generates estimated
savings of $564,823. The average percentage enrollment in capitated managed care for
the 1991 to 1996 period was 25 percent, indicating approximate savings of $14 million
annually. Note that managed care in Medicaid is relatively new and that related savings
may increase as programs mature.
The model further demonstrates important substitute and complementary
relationships in general and between service components of Medicaid programs. In
accordance with the findings by Miller, et al. (1997), a strong relationship exists between
inpatient hospital and physician services. This relationship, however, is twofold; dividing
physician services into those offered by (a) office based general practitioners and (b)
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hospital based physicians in general, the results indicate, respectively, a substitute or
complementary relationship with inpatient hospital services. Significant substitute
relationships also exist between inpatient hospital services and nursing facility services
and hospital outpatient services. The relationship between inpatient hospital services and
intermediate care facility services is significant only after 1991.42
The interrelated nature of the various components o f Medicaid emphasizes the
importance of comprehensive analysis before cost containment measures pertaining to a
single component are initiated. Cost containment policies relating to inpatient hospital
expenditures, for example, will likely generate a redirection of demand toward substitute
services. This migration of demand will, at least partly, offset any reductions in inpatient
budgets. Furthermore, if demand is redirected to a less effective mode of care, long term
costs may actually increase. Any public policy regarding these services must consider
these relationships to be effective.
The results also imply a strong influence by socioeconomic variables. Acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome has resulted in significantly higher inpatient hospital
expenditures in states with relatively high numbers of reported cases. The slowly but
steadily falling number of reported AIDS cases over the past few years may provide a
source of relief for these states.
A socioeconomic variable which performed remarkably well is the average
household size in the state. A consistent and strong negative relationship is found
between the average household size and inpatient hospital expenditures. As discussed
earlier, this may be due to two reasons: first, larger households may mean increased time
costs concerning hospital visits; and, second, larger households are better capable of
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producing substitute care.43 The results presented here provide support the latter
explanation. The first would produce lower utilization only in the short-run. A condition
that does not receive attention when necessary may worsen and require increased care at a
later date. Since the negative relationship between household size and expenditure levels
is stable over time (see regressions A through D), the substitute care hypothesis is favored
over the alternative.
SECTION IV.Vn: SECONDARY EQUATIONS
The secondary dependent variables are:
1. the number of Medicaid recipients in the state,
2. a dummy variable indicating whether a state has adopted a DRG based PPS,
3. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses a rate-of-increase PPS,
4. a dummy variable indicating whether a state uses coverage limitations,
5. the percentage of managed care enrollment.
The variation in the size of Medicaid programs across states is explained using a Median
voter model. According to this model taxpayers derive utility from the consumption of
goods and services as well as from the transfer of income to welfare recipients. The
median voter determines the quantity of public goods by maximizing a utility function
subject to a budget constraint:
maxU{X,W,Z) s.t. Y=PZX+PV,W
(.v.in

(4.A.1)

where X is the quantity o f Medicaid services provided and Px is the tax price to the
median voter of an additional unit of service provided. W represents a composite bundle
o f goods and services, with price Pw, consumed by the median voter, and Z is a set of
exogenous factors which influence the median voter’s preferences for Wor X. The
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specific model used in this case is discussed in the first essay “An Analysis Of The
Variation In Reimbursement Rates O f Pharmaceutical Drugs Under Medicaid.”
The three direct inpatient hospital cost containment and the managed care
equations are estimated using a combination of the median voter model and the economic
theory of regulation, developed by Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler. These equations
are discussed in detail in the third essay “Prospective Payment Methods And Hospital
Expenditures: Special Interests And The Median Voter.”
SECTION IV.VHI: BOOTSTRAPPING METHOD
The model to be estimated consists of six equations:
y i =T;Y2 +yjY3 + T4*Y4 + T 5Y5 +JV/6 + *iPi + e i
1 if y \ > 0
0 otherwise
1 if yj > 0
0 otherwise
1 if j^4 > 0
0 otherwise

(4.B.la)
(4.B.lb)

(4.B.lc)

(4.B.ld)

(4.B.le)

Te “ ^ePe + 86

(4.B.lf)

Where, y xis hospital inpatient expenditures, ^ 2, 73, and ^represent the use of direct cost
containment policies, y 5 is the percentage of recipients enrolled in managed care, and y6
represents the number of Medicaid recipients. The “starred” variables represent the latent
factors which yield the values o f their “non-starred” counterparts. The X, represent
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(N x K t ) matrices of the exogenous variables of each equation, the p, are (AT, x l) vectors
of unknown parameters associated with the exogenous variables, the y , are scalar
unknown parameters associated with the endogenous variables, and the e, are the error
terms. Time and individual subscripts are suppressed. The unit o f observation is the state.
Data was collected for a period o f six years (1991 - 1996).
The bootstrap estimation assumes a diagonal variance-covariance matrix:
0

2=

1

•

•.

1

(4.B.2)

0
To derive the parameter estimates substitute (4.B.lb) - (4.B.lf) into (4.B.la) to derive the
reduced form
y,

— ( ^ 2 ^ 2

^ 2 ) y 2 "*” ( ^ 3 ^ 3

^

3)7 3

^ 4 )y 4

("^ 5 ^ 5

^ 5 )"/ 5

(4.B.3)

(^606 ^ e6)y6 + ^|Pl +E1
Next, separate the error terms, the parameters, and the X-matrices as
y. = *2(P2Y2) +

+ ^4(p4y4) + *s(p5Y5) + ^6(p6Y6) + *iPl + V!

(4.B.4)

where
v, = (s, + y ,s 2 + y 3e3 + y4e4 + y se5 + y 6e6).

(4.B.5)

Rewrite (B.4) compactly as
y, = XTI + v .

The variance of v is defined as
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<*: = or + r\ ■i + y] •i + r] ■i + n ■°7 + r62 •07 + 2/ : covfo>*2)+

(4.B.7)

2 / 3cov^i >f 3) + 2/4 c o v (f|, £ ,) + 2 / 5 c o v f o , f s) + 2/ 6 c o v f o ,£•6)

The covariances cov(e,, e; ) = 0 for i , j = 2,3,4,5,6 and z * j . For re-sampling obtain
(y - X h ) ( y - X h )
(N - K )

(4.B .8)

From (B.7) and (B.8) a -,2 = a -2 - (0), where <f>is defined by right hand side o f (B.7).
The sampling technique used for the bootstrap
Step 1: Estimate equations (B.la) to (B.lf) by the appropriate technique and obtain a f as
indicated above, <t 2,<t 32,<t 2 =1 from the Probit model,
by Tobit, and

ct2

ct2 from

(B.le) estimated

from (B.lf) estimated by OLS.

Step 2: From the reduced form equations calculate the predicted values o f the dependent
variables.
Step 3: Generate random numbers. For each observation, the errors are distributed as
'0

vu

0

£ Im

o

eh

~

(4.B.9)

Q

o

£0, =

£ 4M

0

£ 5m

0

r,2

where Q =

-

or!2

0"l 3

0"l4

cr.5

1

0

0

0

16
0

0

0

0

1

0

0

07

0
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Step 4: Generate u - N ( 0, /) and &>' = (q^w)~ V (0,fi). Use these randomly generated
errors and the predicted values of step 2, construct new y’, and estimate the
parameters using this bootstrap sample. The dichotomous variables are generated
as follows:
Y,= \
'

f1 if y ’ > 0

'

j = 2.3.4

(4.B.11)

}o if y \ < 0

Step 5: Repeat steps 3 - 4 T-times and estimate the variability of the estimates as
v a rfe )= x H " v ‘ 1=1 * I

(4.B .12)

and
se(rrj = -JvarfrcJ .

(4.B.13)
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCULSIONS
A common theme of the three essays o f this dissertation is cost containment in
Medicaid. The first essay examined reimbursement rates of the two main components of
the prescription drug price in the context of pharmaceutical drug expenditure levels. The
second and third essays focussed on cost containment measures pertaining to inpatient
hospital expenditures.
The primary purpose of the first essay was to analyze the extent to which interest
groups, among other factors, influence reimbursement rates of the two components of
pharmaceutical drugs under Medicaid at the state level. Understanding the factors which
determine reimbursement rates, and, in particular, the magnitude of these relationships, is
important for the following reasons. To the extent that differences in the political
influence of interest groups result in differences in reimbursement rates we may expect
there to be discrepancies in the treatment of the poor across states. This has important
implications regarding the goal of Medicaid which is to provide medical services to the
nation’s poor (1) in an equitable fashion and (2) in quantities and qualities comparable to
those observed in the private health industry. These goals may be compromised to the
extent that special interest groups influence reimbursement levels at the state level.
Furthermore, there are policy implications regarding recent arguments made in
the U.S. Congress, concerning increased control over Medicaid at the state level.
Proponents of state control point to advantages of the “efficiency” of localized
adaptation. However, strong influence by interest groups at the state level would likely
result in growing differences in program design and, consequently, greater disparities in

124

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

125
the treatment of the poor across states, contradicting the goals o f the program. Within
the context of pharmaceutical drug reimbursement rates, access problems may arise in
states which severally cut reimbursement rates.
The endogenous variables involve the dispensing fee and the percentage markup
components of the pharmaceutical drug price. The percentage markup constitutes the
difference between reimbursement rates and the actual acquisition cost of drug
ingredients to pharmacists. The analysis employs the economic theory o f legislation and
median voter models to explain the variation in reimbursement rates. The dispensing fee
and percentage markup equations are then considered in a larger system including the
number of Medicaid recipients and the prescription drug expenditures of the state. The
system was estimated using the three stage least squares estimator to take advantage of
the contemporaneous correlation between the equations.
The results indicate that interest groups have significant influence on
reimbursement levels of pharmaceutical drugs. Particularly, the pharmacist and
physician groups are shown to have been successful in protecting their members'
interests. Furthermore, reimbursement levels significantly effect Medicaid
pharmaceutical drug expenditure levels. Therefore, interest groups also indirectly
influence expenditure levels. An important policy implication is that discrepancies in the
treatment of the poor would likely increase with a transfer of control over Medicaid from
the federal to the state level.
The second essay analyzes the factors determining the adoption of Medicaid
inpatient hospital cost containment policies. The purpose and importance of this essay
are similar to those of the first. To the extent that different factors at the state level
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determine the probabilities of agencies adopting cost containment policies we may expect
the treatment o f the poor to be differential across states. As before the findings of this
essay may have some implications for the goals of Medicaid and policies recently
discussed in congress regarding the increased transfer o f control over the program to the
state level. Within the context of Medicaid inpatient hospital, strong utilization controls
may make Medicaid patients a liability to hospitals. As a consequence, these hospitals
would either eliminate or severely limit services offered to Medicaid eligibles. Stated
differently, the quantity and quality of services rendered to Medicaid recipients would
suffer.
The cost containment policies analyzed in this essay are (1) the adoption of a
prospective payment system (PPS) based on diagnosis related groups (DRG), (2) the
adoption of a PPS based on rate-of-increase controls, (3) the adoption of direct utilization
controls, (4) the enrollment of Medicaid eligibles in managed care, and (5) the enrollment
of Medicaid eligibles in capitated managed care. Similar to the first essay, the economic
theory o f legislation and the median voter model play an integral role in explaining the
probabilities of states adopting inpatient hospital cost containment measures.
Both interest group and median voter variables are found to have significant
influence on the probability of states adopting inpatient hospital cost containment
measures. This implies that the quality and cost of Medicaid hospital care across the
states will vary depending on the relative strength of interest groups as well as taxpayers’
generosity. Discrepancies in the treatment of the poor would likely increase with a
transfer o f control to the state level.
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The purpose of the third essay is a comparison of the relative effectiveness of
alternative Medicaid inpatient hospital cost-containment policies. Medicaid agencies
may attempt to control costs by (1) directly controlling prices and utilization of inpatient
hospital services, (2) by employing market oriented managed care principles, or (3) by
indirect controlling the size of the eligible population. The focus is on the first two
alternatives.
States started experimenting with inpatient hospital cost-containment almost
immediately following the enactment of Medicaid. During the 1980s they started
adopting prospective payment mechanisms and direct utilization controls, and during the
1990s the use of managed care started increasing rapidly. Which method achieves the
largest savings? The endogenous variables of interest in this essay are Medicaid inpatient
hospital expenditures, the endogenous variables discussed in the second essay, and the
size of the Medicaid population.
The economic theory o f legislation and the median voter model are used to
explain the adoption of cost-containment policies. In addition to inpatient cost
containment policies the model accounts for supply, demand, federal policy, substitute or
complement services, and non-hospital cost-containment variables. A two stage
estimation method is employed and standard errors are estimated using a bootstrap
method. The results indicate that both direct control over prices or utilization and
managed care are effective in reducing expenditure levels compared to the traditional feefor-service methods. PPS generated larger saving than managed care, perhaps because
the former is relatively well established, while the latter is still relatively new in
Medicaid.
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